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LITIGATION BLUES FOR RED-STATE TRUSTS: JUDICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION ISSUES FOR WILLS AND TRUSTS 
Lee-ford Tritt* 
Abstract 
Will construction—the process wherein a trier of fact must determine 
the testator’s probable intent because the testator’s actual intent is not 
clear—is too little discussed and too often misunderstood in succession 
law jurisprudence. Yet, construction issues are becoming increasingly 
important due to a growing number of will and trust disputes concerning 
the determination of beneficiaries in a post-Obergefell United States. 
Currently, courts are being asked to construe terms like “spouse,” 
“husband,” “wife,” “child,” “son,” “daughter,” and “descendants” in 
estate planning documents during a time in which understandings of 
marriage, identity, reproduction, religious liberty, and public policy are 
rapidly evolving. Interestingly, these various construction cases may 
have disparate legal outcomes depending upon the states in which the 
cases are litigated, even in cases with similar underlying facts. In fact, 
these definitions and consequent outcomes may correlate with the views 
of the state’s dominant political party—whether a state is red or blue. 
Data support the notion that red states and blue states generally have 
different attitudes toward LGBT issues, artificial reproductive 
technology, and religion. Data also support the inference that judges—
particularly elected judges—tend to be influenced by their respective 
state’s attitude. Where a judge’s decision-making is influenced one way 
or the other—toward the red side or the blue side—her approach to will 
construction and her understanding of public policy may reflect that 
tendency. Therefore, diverging public policies in red states and in blue 
states may affect judicial construction and govern dispositions. 
Accordingly, this Article addresses real-world construction issues in the 
estate planning context where a particular state’s approach to the 
redefinition of both words and policy may influence the deemed intent 
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INTRODUCTION  
Steve executes a will, leaving the residuary estate in equal amounts 
“to my three sons, Mike, Robbie, and Chip.” Sometime after the 
execution of the will but before Steve’s death, Steve’s son Robbie 
transitioned into Roberta. Roberta legally changed her name, obtained a 
lawful gender marker change on her forms of identification and birth 
certificate, and had a sex affirmation surgery. Steve did not update his 
will to reflect Roberta’s transgender identity before his death. 
When Steve dies and his executor goes to carry out the will according 
to its terms, the executor is confronted with a description in the will that 
does not exactly fit any person—Steve no longer has three sons; rather, 
Steve has two sons and one daughter (Roberta). Will Roberta still take an 
equal share of the residuary estate under the will? If the provision left the 
residuary estate “to my sons” without listing any individual names, would 
this change the result? In yet another variation, would the result change 
if the provision were included in an irrevocable trust created before 
Roberta transitioned? 
Interestingly, the outcome of this hypothetical scenario may likely 
differ depending on the state in which the judge was construing the will.1 
 
 1. This hypothetical and several others within this Article are based on real-life disputes 
and were originally promulgated and discussed in several speeches addressing the intricacies of 
estate planning and testamentary interpretation in the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Lee-ford 
Tritt, Construction Issues in a Post-Obergefell World, University of Wisconsin Law School (Oct. 
12, 2018); Alicia N. Graves, Amy Morris Hess, Cara M. Koss, and Lee-ford Tritt, The Twenty-
First Century Family: Drafting Wills and Trusts in a Time of Changing Concepts of Family, 
Gender, and Race, ABA Real Property Trust & Estate Law Section CLE Meeting (May 11, 2018); 
Lee-ford Tritt, Document Construction Issues Raised by Changing Concepts of Family, Gender, 
and Race, Southwest Florida Estate Planning Counsel Distinguished Speaker Series (Nov. 2, 
 
844 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
Specifically, the outcome may hinge upon whether that state was red or 
blue. Data support the notion that red states and blue states generally have 
different attitudes toward LGBT issues, artificial reproductive 
technology (ART), and religion.2 Data also support the inference that 
judges—particularly elected judges—tend to be influenced by their 
respective state’s attitude.3 Where a judge’s decision-making is 
influenced one way or the other—toward the red side or the blue side—
her approach to will construction and her understanding of public policy 
may reflect that tendency. Thus, Steve’s will may be construed differently 
in Texas than in Massachusetts.4   
Will construction—the process wherein a trier of fact must determine 
the testator’s probable intent because the testator’s actual intent is not 
clear5—is too little discussed and too often misunderstood in succession 
law jurisprudence. Yet, construction issues are becoming increasingly 
important due to a growing number of will and trust disputes concerning 
the determinative of beneficiaries in a post-Obergefell United States. 
Obergefell v. Hodges,6 the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
made same-sex marriage retroactively legal in all fifty states7 and 
required all states to recognize same-sex marriages from other states,8 
arguably triggered more questions than it answered. Obergefell redefined 
a key construct within American succession law—“marriage” includes 
 
2017); Amy Morris Hess, William P. LaPiana, and Lee-ford Tritt, Document Construction Issues 
in Old and New Instruments in a Post-Obergefell World, ABA Section of Taxation CLE Meeting 
(Sept. 8, 2017); Amy M. Hess, Cara M. Koss, William P. LaPiana, and Lee-ford Tritt, If My 
Grandson Becomes My Granddaughter, Will She Still Get the Farm?, ABA Real Property, Trust 
& Estate Law Section CLE Meeting, (Apr. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Tritt, Granddaughter]. 
 2. See infra Section II.A. 
 3. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Policies on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 169, 171 (2009) (finding that state supreme court judges often vote in line with the 
stereotypical preferences of the retention agents). 
 4. The differing results come from different answers to the same questions. For example, 
judges in all fifty states will have to address complicated questions like, “How is gender defined 
by law? Is a person’s identity rooted in their gender? Is gender even relevant in determining a 
testator’s intention to give to their child?” See Ashleigh C. Rousseau, Note, Transgender 
Beneficiaries: In Becoming Who You Are, Do You Lose the Benefits Attached to Who You Were, 
47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 813, 835 (2018) (citation omitted). 
 5. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 146, at 809–10 (2d ed. 
1953). 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell was a consolidation of six cases from Kentucky, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee that involved fourteen same-sex couples and two widowers from 
same-sex marriages who were either denied marriage licenses or recognition of their out-of-state 
marriages. See id. at 2593. 
 7. See id. at 2604–05 (holding state laws “exclud[ing] same-sex couples from civil 
marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples” to be unconstitutional). 
 8. Id. at 2607–08 (“[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful 
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”). 
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marriage between spouses of the same sex.9 By implication, Obergefell 
redefined the attendant terms that denote a marital relationship; words 
like “spouse,” ”husband,” and “wife” now carry meaning that can 
indicate marital status between members of the same sex.10 Obergefell 
arguably changed the legal understanding of a social concept in response 
to society’s pre-Obergefell redefinition of marriage, illustrating the co-
evolutionary nature of American society and American jurisprudence: 
Where social definitions of concepts change, legal definitions of the 
words that denote those concepts must also change. Here, though, those 
changes provide the springboard for myriad questions that will not be 
answered fifty states at a time—because the laws of succession and 
family are governed by the states.11  
In a federalist society, each state acts as an “insulated chamber” in 
which the beliefs of a state’s constituents can ultimately dictate the 
policies a state enacts.12 Thus, federalism leaves to the states much of the 
law-making that affects the day-to-day lives of their citizens, including 
family law and the laws of succession.13 Now that all states must redefine 
 
 9. Id. For a detailed account of the historical evolution of legal status of same-sex marriage 
in the United States, see Lee-ford Tritt & Patrick J. Duffey, Windsor’s Wake: Non-Traditional 
Estate Planning Issues for Non-Traditional Families, in 48 HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE 
PLANNING ¶¶ 1100, 1101–02 (2014). 
 10. Despite having the opportunity to adjust critical language from “wife” and “husband” 
to the gender-neutral “spouse,” the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has declined to do so. See Lee-
ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of Obergefell, 2016 
WIS. L. REV. 873, 913–14. 
The Treasury Department recently issued final regulations that reflect the 
holdings of Windsor, Obergefell, and Revenue Ruling 2013-17. The regulations 
define terms in the Code describing the marital status of taxpayers for federal tax 
purposes. As in the earlier proposed regulations (NPRM REG-148998-13), the 
final regulations provide that the terms “spouse,” “husband,” and “wife” mean 
an individual lawfully married to another individual, and the term “husband and 
wife” means two individuals lawfully married to each other.  
Id. at 913 n.259. 
 11. See Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490 (2013) (“The regulation of domestic relations 
is traditionally the domain of state law.”). Additionally, while most of this Article’s focus lies on 
LGBT couples, the evolution of familial and marital relationships significantly impacts 
heterosexual couples as well. For example, states’ reluctance to allow and recognize children born 
through ART affects both homosexual couples and heterosexual couples—both kinds of couples 
must resort to ART to fulfill their desire for children. 
 12. Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary 
Analysis of the American System, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 663, 691 (1980) (quoting Truax v. Corrigan, 
257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 13. See id. at 690–91. This state law-making derives from the “residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty” that states retain. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison)). 
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marriage such that same-sex couples are included within the word’s 
meaning, each state also must address the implications of that change 
without the benefit (or burden) of uniform guidance. In general, 
federalism causes variances from state to state in all facets of the legal 
field. Often times, those variances relate to some of the most hot-button 
issues. For example, Illinois has some of the most stringent gun control 
laws in the United States.14 In contrast, Arizona implements loose gun 
control laws; Arizona does not even require registration of guns.15 Many 
similarly controversial issues also differ widely from state to state.16 
Thus, the fact that states differ in their handling of issues that implicate 
LGBT rights—marriage, transitional surgery, adoption, ART—should 
come as no surprise. 
Post-Obergefell, courts are now being asked to construe terms like 
“spouse,” “husband,” “wife,” “child,” “son,” “daughter,” and 
“descendants” during a time in which understandings of marriage, 
identity, reproduction, religious liberty, and public policy are evolving. 
This need is complicated by the fact that neither social nor legal evolution 
occurs uniformly. Citizens’ beliefs on various issues can vary 
dramatically—particularly regarding LGBT issues and definitions of 
“family”—from state to state.17 Thus, for example, who is legally 
regarded as a “child” or as a “parent” is not uniform across all states, and 
the same set of facts may have different outcomes depending on which 
state’s laws govern the succession.18 Often, these definitions and 
consequent outcomes correlate with the views of the state’s dominant 
political party—whether a state is red or blue.19 Data suggest that red 
states and blue states tend to reflect diverging approaches to many of the 
questions that stand unanswered in the wake of Obergefell, particularly 
those that implicate LGBT issues, ART, and religion.20 In estates law, 
where courts regularly rely on a donor’s words to determine what 
 
 14. See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/2 (2015) (requiring Firearm Owner’s Identification Card 
at all times while possessing a firearm). 
 15. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3108 (2020).  
 16. For example, regarding abortion, Kansas imposes strict regulations including 
mandatory counseling, parental consent, and a waiting period. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-
abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/UWS3-9ZWH]. California, on the other hand, imposes none of 
those requirements and goes so far as to enjoin any requirement of parental consent. See id. 
 17. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2020) (providing that, if a family unit 
consists of a parent and the parent’s partner, the parent’s partner may adopt the child without 
terminating the parent’s rights), with Uᴛᴀʜ Cᴏᴅᴇ Aɴɴ. 78B-6-117(3) (2020) (prohibiting adoption 
of a child by any person who is cohabiting in a non-marital relationship unless that person is a 
relative of the child). 
 18. See infra Part V (discussing hypotheticals about same-sex marriage and ART). 
 19. See infra Part IV (comparing red and blue states). 
 20. See infra Part V. 
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meaning should be attributed to a donative document,21 the color of the 
lens through which a judge views a donor’s words is especially important. 
Accordingly, diverging policies in red states and in blue states—even 
post-Obergefell—may affect judicial construction and govern 
dispositions. 
Therefore, this Article addresses real-world construction issues in the 
estate planning context,22 where a particular state’s approach to the 
redefinition of both words and policy may influence the deemed intent 
ascribed to a donor’s words. Concrete examples of likely divergent 
results may be a helpful foundation; an overview of the different 
outcomes that might be reached in red states versus blue states informs 
the discussion of why the results differ, as well as the means red and blue 
judges use to reach different conclusions based on the same facts. 
Accordingly, Part I previews the hypothetical results of applying 
divergent policies in context of the introductory hypothetical. Part II 
begins the explanation of such results by delving into the policies that 
divide the red states from the blue. Part III outlines two basic doctrines 
of estates law—interpretation and construction—that are pertinent to 
judicial decision-making. Part IV expands on that doctrinal explanation 
to examine public policies that constrain testamentary intent: disallowing 
total restraints on marriage, preventing the encouragement of divorce, 
and disfavoring invitations for a court to enter nonjusticiable religious 
controversies. Finally, Part V presents two additional hypotheticals that 
reflect challenges under current succession laws, and more specifically, 
evaluates how red and blue states might vary in their approaches to such 
challenges.  
I.  A HYPOTHETICAL INTRODUCTION: PRESENTING THE 
CONCLUSION FIRST 
This Article discusses how and why red states and blue states are 
likely to differ in their interpretation and construction of testamentary 
documents like Steve’s will, discussed in the introductory hypothetical. 
To understand why results might differ, it is helpful to first understand 
how they do so. The answer to both how and why begins with will 
construction. In terms of Steve’s will, Roberta’s new identity creates an 
 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 22. For example, a living trust of a former Texas district judge, Vickers Cunningham, 
contains a provision that calls for a distribution upon “marriage to someone who is white, 
Christian and of the opposite sex.” Alex Bollinger, GOP Candidate Will Disinherit His Kids if 
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ambiguity.23 In some ways, there is no longer a son Robbie. Did Steve 
not change his will from “my son Robbie” to “my daughter Roberta” 
because Steve objected to the transition and disowned the child? Did 
Steve leave the language unchanged as a slight against the child? Or, did 
Steve simply never get around to revising his will or not think it was 
necessary because it was evident to him what the language meant? 
Because Steve’s actual intention would be impossible to discern from the 
four corners of the instrument, interpretation would fail and the court 
would be required to employ the rules of construction to attribute Steve’s 
probable intent.24 The means a judge uses to determine probable intent 
are grounded in the rules of will construction.25 Thus, how the court 
interprets and applies these rules of construction affects the likely 
outcome.  
A.  In a Red State 
Generally, courts in red states are more likely to adhere to the “plain 
meaning rule”26 and the “no reformation rule,”27 two related rules of 
construction that largely reject extrinsic evidence and any reformed 
reading of a document’s text under the general theory that the 
testamentary document itself provides the best evidence of a testator’s 
probable intent. Conservatives, i.e., Christian republicans, more often 
subscribe to strict constructionism than do democrats.28 Further, as 
discussed below, a red-state judge may be less likely to favor LGBT 
rights.29 Such a court, disinclined to allow Roberta to take under the will, 
could use construction to reach its preferred result. The court could 
classify the will’s failure to identify any particular person as a mistake. 
Under the no reformation rule, even if there was evidence that Steve made 
 
 23. See infra Section III.B.2.i. 
 24. See infra Section III.B. 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 26. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of 
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 PENN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1982) (quoting G. 
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 20.1, at 158 (1978)). 
 27. See Sanderson v. Norcross, 136 N.E. 170, 172 (Mass. 1922) (“Courts have no power to 
reform wills. Hypothetical or imaginary mistakes of testators cannot be corrected. Omissions 
cannot be supplied. Language cannot be modified to meet unforeseen changes in conditions. The 
only means for ascertaining the intent of the testator are the words written and the acts done by 
him.”). 
 28. See Brandon Bartels, It Took Conservatives 50 Years to Get a Reliable Majority on the 




 29. See infra Sections II.B–C.  
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a mistake (and actually intended for Roberta to take a share of the estate), 
that extrinsic evidence would be ignored, causing the bequest to Roberta 
to fail.30 
Notably, even under the no reformation rule, extrinsic evidence 
generally is permissible to make identifications.31 This hypothetical 
demonstrates an identity-related latent ambiguity: on its face, a bequest 
to Robbie is unambiguous, but the underlying facts—that Robbie no 
longer “exists”—reveal ambiguity.32 Even with extrinsic evidence, 
however, Roberta will not automatically take under the will. If, in light 
of the evidence, the court determines Steve fundamentally disagreed with 
the transition and did not intend for Roberta to take, Roberta will not take 
under the will. If Steve knew, at the time of will execution, that Roberta 
was planning to transition and had not yet completed the process, the 
bequest to his son, Robbie, might be evidence of his intention to disinherit 
his daughter, Roberta. In such a situation, the judge’s own biases, as well 
as public opinion, may seep into the construction process; a judge in a red 
state is more likely than a judge in a blue state to construe Steve’s failure 
to react, after the execution of his will, to Roberta’s transition, as 
evidence that Steve did not intend for Roberta to take.33 
In deciding whether Roberta has a right to her share of Steve’s estate, 
the court may have to define Roberta’s identity by either her natal sex or 
brain sex.34 Here, the judge must determine how to define gender 
identity—either by a process that refuses to validate Roberta’s 
transgender identity or by a process that may actually serve to deprive 
Roberta of her inheritance. Why a judge chooses a particular approach 
may be influenced by public opinion and public policy in the relevant 
state.35 For example, some red states, including Texas, have held that a 
person is bound to the sex declared at birth.36  
What about the hypothetical’s variations? If the bequest does not 
identify beneficiaries by name but merely says, “to my sons,” a court that 
adheres to strict construction may refuse to admit extrinsic evidence 
because there is no latent ambiguity revealed in identifying the 
beneficiaries—Steve has two sons, Mike and Chip. In this situation, 
 
 30. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 31. Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 217 (1886) (“It is settled doctrine that . . . [a latent 
ambiguity] may be removed by extrinsic evidence. Such an ambiguity may arise upon a will, 
either when it names a person as the object of a gift, or a thing as the subject of it, and there are 
two persons or things that answer such name or description, or, secondly, it may arise when the 
will contains a misdescription of the object or subject . . . .”). 
 32. See infra Section III.B.2.ii. 
 33. See infra Sections II.B–C.  
 34. See Rousseau, supra note 4, at 835. 
 35. See id. at 835 n.177. 
 36. See id. at 841. 
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Roberta would not take under the will. Courts that would tend to deny 
Roberta her bequest, however, may be bound by other state rulings that 
deny transgender persons rights in other contexts—that a person’s gender 
at birth is controlling.37 If so, such courts would be required to find that 
Roberta is still included in the class of Steve’s “sons.”38 If such precedent 
is not binding on a red-state judge, however, the judge may have to 
recognize Roberta’s transgender identity as legitimate to prevent her from 
taking under the will—and, ironically, the red-state judge would have to 
recognize Roberta’s transgender identity to avoid setting unpopular 
precedent in the judge’s jurisdiction. If, instead of a will, this bequest was 
included in an irrevocable trust, Steve would be unable to change the trust 
terms to include Roberta even if such a change was desired.39 A court in 
a red state may be less likely than a court in a blue state to employ 
equitable deviation or reformation to save Roberta’s inheritance.40 
B.  In a Blue State 
By contrast, courts in blue states may be much more likely to take the 
modern approach and allow extrinsic evidence to shed light on Steve’s 
actual intent.41 Where Steve knew, when he executed his will, that 
Roberta was planning to transition but had not yet completed the process, 
a blue-state judge may be just as influenced as a red-state judge by public 
opinion.42 A blue-state judge could interpret the same evidence—a failure 
to react to subsequent events—as Steve’s intention to include Roberta in 
his will. The judge could reason that if Steve did not intend for Roberta 
to take, Steve would have updated the will to exclude Roberta entirely 
and leave the residuary estate in equal amounts to his two sons, Mike and 
Chip. 
Another approach that a blue-state judge might use is to look at the 
transitional surgery as nothing more than a name change.43 “[A] court 
will likely allow extrinsic evidence to be heard in the event that the 
beneficiary indicated in the will does not match the beneficiary’s identity 
when the will is probated.”44 If Roberta can prove the name change, the 
bequest likely passes to her because name changes cannot defeat a vested 
 
 37. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 38. See Rousseau, supra note 4, at 841. 
 39. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 68 (2020). 
 40. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73, 89–92 (2015) 
(identifying and discussing the doctrine of equitable deviation). 
 41. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 42. See Shepherd, supra note 3, at 171. 
 43. See Rousseau, supra note 4, at 851. 
 44. Id. 
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right if the donee is the same legal person as she was at birth.45 Under this 
approach, a judge could view Roberta as the same birth person as Robert, 
thus allowing Roberta to take the gift intended for Robert.46 While the 
name-change approach might allow transgender individuals to receive 
the bequest that was originally provided for them, such an approach 
should give pause. Because names are given at birth, they do not reach 
the core of someone’s identity. A person’s gender, however, “[is] there 
all along,” growing and evolving as the individual grows and evolves into 
the person they were meant to be.47 Therefore, this approach may be 
unsatisfactory and demoralizing to Roberta.  
In considering the second variation—simply providing a class gift “to 
my sons”—under liberal construction and in line with modern trends, a 
blue-state judge would be much more likely than a red-state judge to 
admit extrinsic evidence. Such evidence would show that Steve had three 
sons at the time of the will’s execution and that Steve intended for all 
three of his children to take. However, blue states that have been more 
accepting of transgender identities do not have caselaw stating that a 
person’s identity is defined by his or her natal sex. Ironically, if a blue-
state court ultimately applied the plain meaning and no reformation rules 
of construction, greater acceptance of transgender identities could 
actually be harmful to Roberta. Roberta, by transitioning into a woman, 
may have effectively transitioned out of the class of “sons.” 
If, instead of a will, this provision was included in an irrevocable trust, 
equitable deviation or reformation might save the bequest. Roberta would 
have to show that her transition was a changed or unanticipated 
circumstance and that deviating from the explicit terms of the trust would 
further Steve’s intent.48 For a blue-state judge, in contrast to a red-state 
judge, Steve’s failure to provide for Roberta’s transition would reinforce 
the inference that Steve did not anticipate the transition. 
 
 45. See Frierson v. Gen. Assembly of the Presb. Church in the U.S., 54 Tenn. 683, 693 
(1872) (“Subsequent changes of name in the corporate body could not defeat the right vested, the 
body itself remaining substantially the same legal person.”). 
 46. Rousseau, supra note 4, at 859.  
 47. Id. Hence, name changes are often completed by judicial decree; a piece of paper can 
alter the identifying factor. A person’s gender, on the other hand, must be altered surgically to 
fully manifest. Accordingly, for courts to view gender-transition surgery as nothing more than a 
name change threatens a failure to recognize the truly transformative undertaking individuals go 
through to change their genders. 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b (2003). 
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II.  RED STATES VS. BLUE STATES: DIFFERENCES IN JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING 
From the conclusions regarding Steve’s will as handled in a red state 
versus a blue state emerges an example of how the same testamentary 
document might yield a different outcome depending on the state in 
which it is construed. To fully appreciate how the results differ, it is 
necessary to understand why they differ. Determining why such results 
are different begins with an analysis of the differences between red and 
blue states. Red states and blue states49 differ in many respects, and 
diverging policies may affect judicial construction and govern 
dispositions. Because judges have wide discretion, especially in equity, 
some differences—for example, contrasting views on LGBT issues, 
ART, and religion—could influence how probate judges decide 
construction and public policy issues, particularly in the realm of 
marriage, divorce, religion, family ties, and homosexuality. First, this 
Part analyzes the differences in how red states and blue states view LGBT 
issues, ART, and religion. Next, this Part discusses how these views 
impact judicial decision-making, with a focus on how judges are 
influenced by public opinion and implicit bias.  
  
 
 49. This Article uses past presidential elections, with a focus on the 2016 election, as well 
as cultural differences to define red states and blue states. One article described red states as those 
“defined by a strict sense of right and wrong and a desire ‘for clear, unbending moral and 
behavioral codes.’” Ashley H. Atwell, Banging Their Heads Against “The Wall”: Partisan 
Politics, Federal Gridlock, and State, Local, and Judicial Reactions to a Lack of Federal 
Immigration Reform, 77 UMKC L. REV.  457, 458 (2008) (quoting Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, 
Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 467–68 (2007)). By 
contrast, blue states “analyze[] political issues from a ‘context-dependent rather than rule-based’ 
perspective.” Id. (quoting Cahn & Carbone, supra, at 472). Based on these definitions, as well as 
this Article’s findings on the differences between states in their views on polarizing issues, this 
Article has included Virginia in the red states. Even though Virginia voted blue in the past 
election, it is culturally red. This Article has identified nineteen blue states and thirty-one red 
states. 
The blue states are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Zachary Crockett, How Has Your State 
Voted in the Past 15 Elections?, VOX (Nov. 9, 2016, 10:29 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2016/11/8/13563106/election-map-historical-vote [https://perma.cc/3ZYZ-KMNC] 
(scroll down to view the data on the 2016 chart). 
The red states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. 
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A.  Differences Between Red States and Blue States on LGBT Issues, 
ART, and Religion 
Not surprisingly, red and blue states diverge in their views on LGBT 
issues, ART, and religion. Everyone has heard the stereotypes: red states 
are predominantly Christian and are opposed to same-sex marriage, while 
blue states care less about religion and more about LGBT rights. This 
section confirms these stereotypes by showing a correlation between 
more Christianity and less LGBT rights in red states, and a similar 
correlation between more LGBT rights and less Christianity in blue 
states. Additionally, a less obvious pattern emerges in the context of 
ART: blue states provide easier access to ART than do red states—
although the difference between red and blue states with respect to ART 
is not as distinct as the differences in other areas.   
1.  Red States vs. Blue States: LGBT Issues 
LGBT issues reveal sharp differences between red states and blue 
states. Some such issues include same-sex marriage, the marital 
presumption, the law of adoption, second-parent adoption, and 
antidiscrimination laws.50  
i.  Same-Sex Marriage  
The majority of the first states to legalize same-sex marriage were 
blue.51 Red states were the last to legalize same-sex marriage—and they 
 
 50. For a discussion concerning how the differences between the laws and social norms of 
red states and blue states impact LGBT and other minority stakeholders under a business entity 
setting, see Lee-ford Tritt & Ryan Scott Teschner, Amazon Delivers Diversity: Geographical & 
Social Influences on Corporate Embeddedness, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2019). 
 51. In 2003, “Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage.” Same-
Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/ 
06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/6PK7-4DVM]. In 2008, Connecticut 
followed suit. Id. (click on and drag the arrow indicator to move it to 2008). In 2009, New 
Hampshire and Vermont legalized same-sex marriage, along with red state Iowa. Id. (click on and 
drag the arrow indicator to move it to 2009). In 2011, New York legalized same-sex marriage. Id. 
(click on and drag the arrow indicator to move it to 2011). In 2012, Maine, Maryland, and 
Washington joined the movement. Id. (click on and drag the arrow indicator to move it to 2012). 
The next year, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, and 
Rhode Island legalized same-sex marriage. Id. (click on and drag the arrow indicator to move it 
to 2013). That same year, same-sex marriage was restored in California after an extensive legal 
battle over whether the state’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage was 
constitutional. Id. In 2014, the remaining blue states⎯Colorado, Nevada, and Oregon⎯legalized 
same-sex marriage. Id. (click on and drag the arrow indicator to move it to 2014). Many red states 
also legalized same-sex marriage in 2014, but several held on until they were forced to legalize 
it. Id. 
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only did so because the U.S. Supreme Court required it.52 A 2014 study 
of the attitude toward same-sex marriage across states revealed that all 
states with a same-sex marriage approval rate below 50% were red.53 
Even today, red states are trying to create roadblocks for same-sex 
couples. In Texas, for example, the state’s highest court recently decided 
that same-sex spouses are not guaranteed the state employee benefits 
extended to “traditional” spouses.54 While red states must recognize 
same-sex marriage, some are still actively fighting against equality for 
same-sex couples.55 
ii.  The Marital Presumption 
Another key issue in the evolving marital landscape is the marital 
presumption’s applicability in same-sex marriages. The traditional 
marital presumption presumes married parents “to be the parents of any 
 
 52. See id. (leaving Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas as the 
states that had not legalized same-sex marriage prior to Obergefell). In the 2016 election, all of 
these states were red states. Crockett, supra note 49 (scroll down to view the data on the 2016 
chart). In the 2012 and 2008 elections, all but Florida, Michigan, and Ohio were red states. Id. 
(scroll down to view the data on the 2012 and 2008 charts). In the 2004 and 2000 elections, only 
Michigan was a blue state. Id. (scroll down to view the data on the 2004 and 2000 charts). This 
shows a red trend in these states leading up to the Obergefell decision in 2015 and shortly 
thereafter. 
 53. ANDREW R. FLORES & SCOTT BARCLAY, THE WILLIAMS INST., TRENDS IN PUBLIC 
SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES BY STATE fig.1 (2015), https://williams 
institute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/State-Trends-Public-Support-SS-Couples-Apr-2015. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZR2-97Z7]. 
 54. See Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73, 89 (Tex. 2017) (reversing the appellate court’s 
decision, which found that the trial court could not enjoin the City of Houston from providing 
employee benefits to same-sex spouses). The court concluded that Obergefell did not control this 
issue, so it would not instruct the lower court how to decide the issue on remand. Id. Essentially, 
the court approved of denying these benefits to same-sex spouses, even though different-sex 
spouses would receive them. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on this decision. See 
Turner v. Pidgeon, 138 S. Ct. 505 (2017) (mem.).  
 55. For example, Tennessee recently passed a bill that protects adoption agencies that deny 
LGBT adoption applications on religious-objection grounds. See Danielle Wallace, Tennessee 
Passes Law Allowing Agencies to Deny LGBTQ Adoption Applications Because of Religious 
Objections, FOX NEWS (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/tennessee-law-adoption-
lgbtq-gay-couples-religious-objections-gov-bill-lee [https://perma.cc/2CGC-EDZK]. Texas has 
also recently passed bills that restrict the rights of same-sex couples. Tex. Health & Safety Code 
Ann. § 192.008(a) (West 2019) (providing that any “supplementary birth certificate of an adopted 
child must be in the names of the adoptive parents, one of whom must be a female, named as the 
mother, and the other of whom must be a male, named as the father”); Tex. Penal Code Ann. 
§ 21.11(b) (West 2019) (limiting the so-called Romeo and Juliet affirmative defense to opposite-
sex sexual contact). 
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child born into the marriage.”56 Before DNA and blood tests, the marital 
presumption served the purpose of establishing paternity.57 In essence, 
“maternity [is] established by a woman’s giving birth to a child.”58 The 
woman’s husband—assuming there was a husband—is presumed to be 
the father.59 This presumption exists to serve the public policy favoring 
harmonious family relations.60 
However, Obergefell’s legalization of same-sex marriage complicates 
the applicability of the marital presumption. After all, the presumption is 
a common law doctrine aimed at establishing parenthood in biological 
terms.61 In other words, despite the concept’s use of the term “marital,” 
the doctrine does not contemplate the validity of a marriage. Thus, while 
Obergefell evidences a shift in policy toward equal marriage rights for 
same-sex couples, the decision does not explicitly stand to require the 
marital presumption to apply to such couples. 
As a result, the scope of the marital presumption in the same-sex 
context is for now left to the states. Of the states whose courts have 
allowed the marital presumption62 to apply to same-sex couples when no 
other third party is involved, nineteen are blue and sixteen are red.63 This 
means 100% of blue states have allowed the marital presumption to apply 
where no third party is involved, compared to only 52% of red states. 
Additionally, the states that have made their marital presumption statutes 
gender-neutral are all blue.64 
 
 56. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Past, Present and Future of the Marital 
Presumption, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 387, 388 (Bill Atkin ed., 2013). 
 57. See id. at 388–89 (discussing the effect of easily accessible paternity tests on the marital 
presumption). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 388. This presumption, however, is only a starting point in identifying a child’s 
parents. The marital presumption can be rebutted with evidence of the mother’s infidelity, the 
husband’s absence around the time of conception, or the husband’s impotence. See id. at 389. 
 60. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989) (“[A]s a matter of overriding 
social policy . . . the integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.” (quoting Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005 (Ct. App. 1987))).  
 61. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 56, at 388. 
 62. Under the traditional marital presumption, any child born to the wife would be 
presumed to be the child of the husband. Id. at 387. 
 63. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-
Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 667 (2016). 
 64. Cf. Memorandum from Courtney Joslin to the Drafting Committee on Uniform 
Parentage Act Revisions 3 (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/ 
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=7907c1cc-7516-73ad-5807-e0e0f87fdda3& 
forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/X5BV-9W3Y]. Those states are California, Illinois, Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Washington. Id. 
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iii.  Law of Adoption 
The redefinition of the marital relationship is not the first legal 
adjustment to the American understanding of family structure and 
inheritance law.65 Until the late nineteenth century, law and public policy 
considered adopted children—much like same-sex spouses, until very 
recently—artificial relatives created by “unnatural” relationships.66 Even 
when formal adoption was legalized in the mid-nineteenth century,67 
courts curtailed adoption’s legal and economic implications under the so-
called stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.68 This doctrine, based on social 
aversion, presumed that a person not directly involved in the adoption 
itself (i.e., a stranger to the adoption), who did not explicitly include an 
adoptee in a class gift, did not indicate intent for the adoptee to take 
simply by using language like “child,” “issue,” or “descendant.”69 Courts 
reasoned that, like a pre-Obergefell testator in a state that did not 
recognize same-sex marriage, this stranger-to-the-adoption testator used 
a particular word to signal its traditional meaning, not its now-expanded 
legal definition.70 Under the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine, therefore, 
a class gift to “descendants” excluded adopted descendants.71  
As social acceptance of adoption increased, however, courts that 
failed to recognize adopted children as “children” under class gifts ran 
the risk of defeating donors’ intent. To reconcile the gap between 
society’s increasingly inclusionary definition of the parent–child 
relationship and inheritance law’s presumptively exclusionary treatment 
of adopted children, three key exceptions emerged72 that allowed the 
court to govern the definition of “child” while preserving testamentary 
freedom. Ultimately, the exceptions became superfluous when the 
stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine was abolished.73 But until the parent–
 
 65. For an examination of the changing face of the parent-child relationship in light of 
illegitimate children gaining legal recognition, see Tritt, supra note 10, at 907–12.  
 66. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1099 
(2003). 
 67. “Massachusetts enacted what is generally characterized as the first modern adoption 
statute” in 1851. Id. at 1102–03. 
 68. Id. at 1128–29. 
 69. Id. at 1129–30. 
 70. See, e.g., Abramovic v. Brunken, 16 Cal. App. 3d 719, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Foley 
v. Evans, 570 N.E.2d 179, 182 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
 71. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Campbell, S.W.2d 744, 749 (Tenn. 1988). 
 72. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 73. Today, most states have abandoned the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine. See Ralph C. 
Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 154 
(“The old ‘stranger-to-the-adoption’ rule—by which an adopted child generally could not inherit 
through the adoptive parent from relatives who were not themselves parties to the adoption—has 
largely, and properly, gone out of fashion.”).  
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child relationship was both legally and socially understood to encompass 
the relationship between adoptive parents and adopted children, those 
exceptions allowed courts to navigate the ambiguity inherent in 
definitional change.74 
While adoption itself has become more socially accepted, same-sex-
couple adoption has yet to find uniform approval. For example, Georgia, 
a red state, is currently trying to pass legislation that would have the 
intended effect of preventing same-sex couples from adopting children.75 
Ten other red states already have similar laws in place.76 Likewise, those 
same ten states also have laws restricting same-sex couples’ ability to 
foster children.77 In contrast, no blue state has legislation providing for 
similar restrictions in either adoption or foster parenting.78  
iv.  Second-Parent Adoption  
In the same vein as traditional adoption, red and blue states differ in 
their approaches to second-parent adoption. The notion of second-parent 
adoption specifically relates to same-sex couples who use ART. “A 
second parent adoption . . . is a legal procedure that allows a same-sex 
 
 74. These judicially created exceptions are but one excellent example of this Article’s 
underlying premise—that judges are inclined to interpret the law in ways that conform to societal 
and cultural pressures, even if the law itself has yet to explicitly address the issue. 
 75. S.B. 368, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2020). This bill is couched as a religious-
freedom bill, but it would allow adoption agencies to reject same-sex couples. See id. Georgia’s 
General Assembly attempted to pass similar legislation in 2018, entitled the “Keep Faith in 
Adoption and Foster Care Act.” S.B. 375, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018). 
 76. Those states are Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 26-10D-2 (2019); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-5322 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.23g (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-
3(5) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-8-112 (2019); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-6-38 (2019); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (West 2019); VA. CODE 
ANN.  § 63.2-1709.3 (2019); H.B. 4950, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2019) (prohibiting 
licensing regulations promulgated by the Department of Social Services from 
“discriminat[ing] . . . on the basis . . . that a faith-based child placing agency has declined or will 
decline to provide any service that conflicts with . . . a sincerely-held religious belief . . . of 
the . . . agency.”). The ACLU challenged the Michigan law in court in 2017, arguing that it is 
unconstitutional based on the First Amendment Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Complaint at 1, Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706, 714 
(E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 17-cv-13080). The state settled the case in 2019 and agreed to “require 
all taxpayer funded, state-contracted child welfare agencies to accept all qualified families, 
including same-sex couples.” Leslie Cooper, Same-Sex Couples Are Being Turned Away From 
Becoming Foster and Adoptive Parents in Michigan. So We’re Suing., ACLU (Sept. 20, 2017, 
10:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/lgbt-parenting/same-sex-couples-are-being-
turned-away-becoming-foster-and-adoptive [https://perma.cc/62WX-VM3E]. 
 77. See Foster and Adoption Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbt 
map.org/equality-maps/foster_and_adoption_laws [https://perma.cc/RN8H-VSXZ]. 
 78. See id. 
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parent, regardless of whether they have a legally recognized relationship 
to the other parent, to adopt her or his partner’s biological or adoptive 
child without terminating the first parent’s legal status as a parent.”79 
Second-parent adoption is so significant in the life of a same-sex couple 
because it allows—or alternatively, disallows—one partner of the same-
sex couple to adopt the other partner’s biological descendant without 
terminating the biological partner’s parental rights.80 Of the fourteen 
states that allow second-parent adoption, nine are blue81 and five are 
red.82 
v.  Antidiscrimination Laws 
Red states and blue states also differ in their LGBT antidiscrimination 
laws. Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision, Bostock v. Clayton 
County,83 the majority of red states did not prohibit employment 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity,84 while 
all blue states did—without being forced to do so.85 Currently, all blue 
states prohibit housing discrimination based on sexual orientation,86 
 
 79. Adoption by LGBT Parents, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., http://www.nclrights 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2PA_state_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E6D-7WFM]. 
 80. In states that do not recognize second-parent adoption, only one of the same-sex spouses 
can adopt the child because in those states a child can only have one father and one mother. See 
Second Parent Adoption, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/second-parent-
adoption [https://perma.cc/WY3Z-F5YW].  
 81. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Adoption by LGBT Parents, supra note 79. 
 82. These states are Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Id. 
 83.  140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that firing an individual based on sexuality or gender 
identity violates Title VII). 
 84. Those states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Employment, HUM. RTS. 
CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment [https://perma.cc/C3SH-TQF3]. The 
only red states that prohibited employment discrimination pre-Bostock based on both sexual 
orientation and gender identity were Iowa and Utah. Id. Wisconsin prohibited discrimination 
based on sexual orientation only. Id. A few red states prohibited gender identity and sexual 
orientation discrimination against only public employees. Id. (listing Indiana, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia in this category). Additionally, Alaska, 
Arizona, Missouri, and North Carolina prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation, not 
gender identity, for only public employees. Id. 
 85. Id. As a reminder, the nineteen blue states are California, Connecticut, Colorado, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington.   
 86. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Housing, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/housing [https://perma.cc/5LEE-VR7S]. 
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compared to only two red states with such prohibitions.87 In addition, all 
red states—except for Wisconsin and Iowa—allow public 
accommodation discrimination based on sexual orientation.88 North 
Carolina, a red state, wielded its preemption power89 to not only allow 
gender identity discrimination in public accommodations, but require it.90 
South Carolina has similarly attempted this kind of preemption.91 
Meanwhile, all blue states prohibit public accommodation discrimination 
based on both sexual orientation and gender identity.92  
There are also differences between red and blue states in how they 
address hate crimes against LGBT individuals. Only two red states 
address both hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation and hate crimes 
motivated by gender identity.93 By contrast, every blue state except one 
addresses both of these types of hate crimes—New Hampshire addresses 
hate crimes based on sexual orientation but not gender identity.94 
Nineteen red states neither address hate crimes based on sexual 
 
 87. Those two states are Utah and Wisconsin. Id. Utah prohibits housing discrimination 
based on both gender identity and sexual orientation. Id. Wisconsin only prohibits housing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, not gender identity. Id. All other red states do not 
prohibit housing discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Id. 
 88. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Public Accommodations, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/public-accomodations [https://perma.cc/TT29-NQ8P]. Wisconsin 
prohibits public accommodation discrimination based on sexual orientation, while Iowa prohibits 
such discrimination based on either sexual orientation or gender identity. Id. 
 89. Even if blue cities within a red state pass ordinances providing more protection for 
LGBT individuals, the state can pass legislation that preempts these local ordinances. See William 
Peter Maruides, The Use of Preemption to Limit Social Progress in South Carolina: The Road to 
the Bathroom Bill, 69 S.C. L. REV. 977, 977 (2018). Because of this, cities can quickly become 
just as discriminatory as the rest of the state. 
 90. See id. at 978–79. Charlotte had passed an ordinance that did not allow public facilities 
to mandate that bathrooms had to be used only by those who were biologically the sex posted on 
the door, regardless of the sex with which they identified. See id. at 979. North Carolina passed 
legislation preempting this ordinance, so that public facilities were required to be regulated in this 
way. See id. This legislation was famously referred to as the “Charlotte Bathroom Bill.” See id. at 
978. After much public outcry, North Carolina repealed this bill, but it required Charlotte to repeal 
the ordinance that prevented public accommodation discrimination based on gender identity. See 
id. at 979. Many believe that this compromise left transgender individuals in the same position as 
if the bill had not been repealed. See id. 
 91. See id. at 998. A bill that was modeled after the North Carolina Bathroom Bill was 
struck down in 2016. Id. at 998–99. In 2017, South Carolina proposed another Bathroom Bill, 
which is still pending. See H.B. 3012, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2017); see also Maruides, 
supra note 89, at 999–1000 (discussing the pending House Bill).  
 92. See id. 
 93. Those states are Missouri and Utah. State Maps of Laws & Policies: Hate Crimes, HUM. 
RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/M4G7-CAHL]. 
 94. See id. 
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orientation nor hate crimes based on gender identity.95 All blue states 
address hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation bias.96  
2.  Red States vs. Blue States: ART 
Closely related to the issue of same-sex marriage and the resultant 
issues with adoption is the use of ART by same-sex couples.97 While 
there are a few federal regulations of ART—one example is the Fertility 
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 199298—most of ART is 
governed by the states.99 And most states have enacted legislation that 
addresses some aspect of ART,100 including issues that range from the 
 
 95. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. Five of these states—
Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming—do not have hate crime statutes at 
all. Id. 
This is a disturbing trend based on the rates of crimes motivated by bias against sexual 
orientation. The FBI gathers data on hate crimes, which is not limited to crimes under a hate crime 
statute. For the purposes of its research, the FBI defines hate crimes as “criminal offenses that 
were motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a race, gender, gender identity, 
religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, and were committed against persons, property, 
or society.” FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2016 HATE CRIME 
STATISTICS: METHODOLOGY 1 (2016). In 2016, there were 7,615 reported victims of hate crimes 
in the United States. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2016 HATE CRIME 
STATISTICS: VICTIMS 1 (2016). Of those victims, 16.7%, or approximately 1,272, were targeted 
because of their sexual orientation. Id. This makes LGBT individuals the third highest group of 
hate crime victims. Id. at 1–2. There likely are many more victims of sexual orientation hate 
crimes, however, because many crimes go unreported to law enforcement agencies, and law 
enforcement agencies are not required to report their statistics to the FBI, which compiles these 
statistics. See Jordan Dashow, New FBI Data Shows Increased Reported Incidents of Anti-LGBTQ 
Hate Crimes in 2016, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/new-fbi-
data-shows-increased-reported-incidents-of-anti-lgbtq-hate-crimes-i [https://perma.cc/838D-7V9Q]. 
 96. See State Maps of Laws & Policies: Hate Crimes, supra note 93. 
 97. For a discussion concerning the impact of the changing nature of the American family 
and ART on the laws of succession, see Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated 
Functionally Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367, 374–
79 (2009) [hereinafter Tritt, Sperms and Estates]. See also Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction 
or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 62 
ALA. L. REV. 273, 303–12 (2010) [hereinafter Tritt, Technical Correction] (discussing ART’s 
treatment under the Uniform Probate Code).  
 98. See generally Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 (2018)) (imposing reporting 
requirements on ART programs). 
 99. See Jonathan J. Morgan, State Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology 4–5 
(July 9, 2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis) (on file with the Brigham Young University Scholars 
Archive). 
 100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-701 (2019); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2019); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2019); CAL FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-
106 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-771 to -779 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 721.11 (2019); GA. CODE 
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legality of surrogacy contracts to parental and custodial challenges 
following the use of ART.101 
Because ART is mostly a state issue, the red versus blue differences 
are more visible as compared to other issues that have at least some 
federal uniformity. However, the variances between red and blue states’ 
regulation of ART are slight.102 For example, the vast majority of both 
red and blue states allow surrogacy.103 While not an absolute necessity, 
surrogacy plays a major role in facilitating the ART process.104 Surrogacy 
can be used in many situations, including absence of uterus,105 recurrent 
pregnancy loss, and excessive maternal risk.106 Surrogacy not only 
improves pregnancy and live birth rates in general, it also results in better 
prenatal outcomes.107 In short, a state’s stance on surrogacy can seriously 
impact the availability of ART for couples—heterosexual and 
homosexual alike.  
While commercial surrogacy is accepted generally in the United 
States,108 state laws governing surrogacy contracts show that blue states 
 
ANN. § 19-7-21 (2019); IDAHO CODE § 39-5401 to -5408 (2019); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/701 
(2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2718 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2020); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 700.2114 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2019); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.510 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B1 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:17-44 (West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-701 (West 2019); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 
(McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01, -05 (2020); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.88 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 109.239, .243, .247 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2020); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 160.701 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 to -165 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.600 
(2020); WIS. STAT. § 891.40 (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-901 to -907 (2020).  
 101. See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 147, 162–63 (2000) (addressing the real and constructive barriers that disincentivize 
same-sex couples from using ART). 
 102. In general, both red and blue states support ART. See Equality Maps: Other Parental 
Recognition Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/other_parenting_laws [https://perma.cc/F8ZE-2TLE]. However, there are some variances 
in regulations that show ART is slightly more accessible in blue states. See id. 
 103. The United States Surrogacy Law Map, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, 
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ [https://perma.cc/QFQ8-EK2D].  
 104. See Mohammad Reza Sadeghi, Surrogacy, an Excellent Opportunity for Women with 
More Threats, 20 J. REPRODUCTIVE INFERTILITY 63, 63 (2019) (“[Surrogacy] may be the only 
option for many couples to have a child from their own gametes . . . .”). 
 105. Traditionally, an absence of uterus has been implicated after some need to remove a 
woman’s uterus, like ovarian cancer. More recently, however—and more pertinent to this 
Article—an absence of uterus has been implicated in homosexual relationships between two men, 
for obvious reasons.  
 106. Sadeghi, supra note 104, at 63. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. By comparison, many European countries—for example, Germany, Sweden, and 
Italy—prohibit surrogacy. Id.  
 
862 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
are generally more surrogate friendly than red states.109 All ten states that 
are considered the most surrogate friendly are blue states.110 Out of the 
four states that are the least surrogate friendly,111 three are red.112  
In terms of ART-related insurance, sixteen states have enacted 
legislation requiring private insurance carriers to provide or offer 
coverage for infertility treatment.113 Of these sixteen states, six are red114 
and ten are blue.115 This means that 53% of blue states have legislation 
requiring ART-insurance coverage, while only 20% of red states have the 
same requirement.  
While most states support ART in general, blue states are more same-
sex couple friendly in terms of accessing ART than are their red 
counterparts. In fact, all of the states that have made their ART statutes 
gender-neutral—to support same-sex couples—are blue states.116 
Additionally, certain blue states are establishing same-sex ART equality 
by amending their insurance statutes.117 For example, California requires 
insurance coverage to apply to infertility treatments, with the exclusion 
 
 109. See The United States Surrogacy Law Map, supra note 103.  
 110. See id. (listing California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington as the most surrogate-friendly states).  
Being the most surrogate-friendly means that these states permit surrogacy “for all parents, pre-
birth orders are granted throughout the state, and both parents will be named on the birth 
certificate.” Id. 
 111. See id. (listing Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, and New York in the bottom tiers of 
surrogacy accessibility). 
 112. Those three are Arizona, Indiana, and Michigan. Id. Michigan bans surrogacy 
altogether. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2018). Louisiana, another red state, restricts 
surrogacy to married couples using their own gametes. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 2718 (2018); see 
also id. § 2719 (prohibiting genetic gestational surrogacy). This has implications for same-sex 
couples. Gametes are defined as “a mature male or female germ cell . . . capable of initiating 
formation of a new diploid individual by fusion with a gamete of the opposite sex.”  Gamete, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gamete [https://perma.cc/ 
H4EE-Y7J2]. Since the parents must use their own gametes under Louisiana law, this precludes 
same-sex couples in Louisiana from using surrogacy to have children. 
 113. State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (June 12, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-
infertility-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/D4PY-U7YP]. 
 114. The red states are Arkansas, Louisiana, Montana, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia. See 
id. Texas requires health insurance carriers to offer this kind of coverage, while the others require 
this coverage. See id.  
 115. The blue states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. See id. California requires health 
insurance carriers to offer this kind of coverage while the other states require this coverage. Id. 
 116. Those states are California, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and 
Washington. Memorandum from Courtney Joslin to the Drafting Committee on Uniform 
Parentage Act Revisions, supra note 64, at 1 n.2. 
 117. Annual Review Article, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
313, 346 (2019). 
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of in vitro fertilization.118 Maryland took a more straightforward 
approach, removing a restriction that required insurance companies to 
cover ART procedures only if the husband’s sperm was used.119 As a 
result, lesbian couples in Maryland were awarded equal insurance 
coverage for ART procedures. 
Few red states have taken similar actions to improve ART access for 
same-sex couples. Moreover, as red states are more inclined to adopt 
religious liberty laws,120 it is uncertain whether the Court’s decision in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby121 will permit exemptions to providing ART 
coverage to same-sex couples on religious-objection grounds.122 
3.  Red States vs. Blue States: Religion 
There are also religious differences between red states and blue states. 
In the United States, 70.6% of the population is Christian.123 The two 
most prevalent types of Christianity are evangelical Protestantism, at 
25.4%, and Catholicism, at 20.8%.124 In the Southern region of the United 
States—which is dominated by red states and commonly referred to as 
 
 118. See Cᴀʟ. Iɴs. Cᴏᴅᴇ § 10119.6 (West 2020). California’s law is an example of what may 
come to pass in many more states. Because the American Medical Association declared infertility 
to be a disease in 2017, more states will likely require insurance companies to begin offering 
coverage for treatments that counteract infertility. See Sophie Bearman, Fertility Treatments Are 
Becoming a Financial and Physical Risk for Many Americans, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2017, 10:31 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/17/most-patients-getting-ivf-arentcovered-by-insurance.html 
[https://perma.cc/6CB9-RRKM]; Sara Berg, AMA Backs Global Health Experts in Calling 
Infertility a Disease, AM. MED. ASS’N (June 13, 2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-
care/public-health/ama-backs-global-health-experts-calling-infertility-disease [https://perma.cc/ 
UY5N-JKMU]. Thus, because same-sex couples could be fairly viewed as infertile—unable to 
conceive children through conventional spousal reproduction—insurance coverage for infertility 
would allow better access for same-sex couples to ART. 
 119. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(b) (West 2019). 
 120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10D-2 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.23g (2020); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 11-62-5 (2019). 
 121. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 122. See Annual Review Article, supra note 117, at 346. In the same vein, another barrier to 
same-sex couples accessing ART is a physician’s discretion to refuse to provide ART procedures 
to same-sex couples. See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (holding 
that physicians have no common law duty to treat same-sex couples); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-
7(d) (2018) (“No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of any part 
of a health service program or research activity . . . if his performance or assistance in the 
performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or 
moral convictions.”). 
 123. See Religious Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/ 
religious-landscape-study/ [https://perma.cc/YW9U-PFYR]. 
 124. Id. 
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the “Bible Belt”125—76% of the population is Christian.126 In this region, 
there are more evangelical Protestants, at 34%, than Catholics, at only 
15%.127 In the Midwest, which is composed mostly of red states, 73% of 
the population is Christian.128 The percentage of evangelical Protestants 
in this area is also higher than the percentage of Catholics, at 26% and 
21%, respectively.129  
In contrast to red regions averaging about 75% Christianity, blue 
regions hover closer to 65%. Moreover, while red regions typically have 
more evangelical Protestants, blue regions generally have more 
Catholics. For example, in the Northeast, which is dominated by blue 
states, 65% of the population is Christian.130 Catholicism is more 
prevalent than evangelical Protestantism (30% of the population is 
Catholic and 13% is evangelical Protestant).131 Additionally, in the West, 
another blue-dominated region, 64% of the population is Christian,132 
22% is evangelical Protestant, and 23% is Catholic.133 And when 
compared to red regions, blue regions also have higher rates of either no 
religion or “nothing in particular.”134  
 
 125. “The Bible Belt is an area of the US [sic] where evangelical Protestantism plays an 
especially strong role in society and politics. People in the Bible Belt tend to be socially 
conservative and have higher church attendance rates than people in other parts of the country.” 
Mark Abadi & Shayanne Gal, The US Is Split into More than a Dozen ‘Belts’ Defined by Industry, 
Weather, and Even Health, BUS. INSIDER (May 7, 2018, 8:47 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/regions-america-bible-belt-rust-belt-2018-4#the-bible-belt-1 
[https://perma.cc/53JL-UJJW]. The Bible Belt encompasses Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, large 
portions of Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Kansas, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. See id. 
 126. See Religious Landscape Study: Religious Composition of Adults in the South, PEW RES. 
CTR. [hereinafter Religious Composition in the South], http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/region/south/ [https://perma.cc/H8DF-THZX]. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Religious Landscape Study: Religious Composition of Adults in the Midwest, PEW 
RES. CTR. [hereinafter Religious Composition in the Midwest], http://www.pewforum.org/ 
religious-landscape-study/region/midwest/ [https://perma.cc/2YRP-7KQJ]. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Religious Landscape Study: Religious Composition of Adults in the Northeast, PEW 
RES. CTR. [hereinafter Religious Composition in the Northeast], http://www.pewforum.org/ 
religious-landscape-study/region/northeast/ [https://perma.cc/L4QQ-TUW2]. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Religious Landscape Study: Religious Composition of Adults in the West, PEW RES. 
CTR. [hereinafter Religious Composition in the West], http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/region/west/ [https://perma.cc/74SQ-WJLV]. 
 133. See id. 
 134. In the West, 28% of the population is nonreligious, and 19% of the population reported 
“[n]othing in particular.” Religious Composition in the West, supra note 132. In the Northeast, 
25% of the population is nonreligious and 16% reported “[n]othing in particular.” Religious 
Composition in the Northeast, supra note 130. In the South, only 19% of the population is 
nonreligious and 14% reported “[n]othing in particular.” Religious Composition in the South, 
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The above differences show a correlation between red states and 
higher rates of Christianity, and a correlation between blue states and 
lower rates of Christianity. There are also slight correlations between red 
states and evangelical Protestantism and blue states and Catholicism. 
These correlations are bolstered by studies that show evangelical 
Protestants are more likely to be Republican than are Catholics.135 One 
study found that 56% of evangelical Protestants are Republican, while 
only 37% of Catholics are Republican.136 In general, Christians are nearly 
twice as likely to be Republican than non-Christians.137 
Not surprisingly, more red states than blue states have religious 
freedom bills—statutes that allow individuals to deny people services, 
goods, or accommodations if doing so would be contrary to their religious 
beliefs.138 A total of twenty-one states have passed such Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs).139 Of these states, four are blue140 
and the remaining seventeen are red.141 Typically, RFRAs “require strict 
scrutiny when a religious adherent claims that a government law or policy 
imposes a substantial burden on the adherent’s exercise of [religious 
freedom.]”142 In one case, for example, Hobby Lobby used the federal 
RFRA to argue that it could not be required to provide its employees with 
contraception because doing so was against the company’s religious 
beliefs.143 Companies can also use RFRAs to argue they cannot be 
required to serve LGBT individuals. 
 
supra note 126. Lastly, in the Midwest, 22% is nonreligious and 16% reported “[n]othing in 
particular.” Religious Composition in the Midwest, supra note 128.  
 135. See Religious Landscape Study: Party Affiliation, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pew 
forum.org/religious-landscape-study/party-affiliation/ [https://perma.cc/VSJ2-7LYH]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Compare id. (breaking down religious denominations by political affiliation), with 
Religious Landscape Study, supra note 123 (showing each religious denomination’s share of the 
general population). Running the numbers shows that about 23% of non-Christians are Republican 
whereas roughly 43% of Christians are Republican.  
 138. See Jacob R. McMillian, After “I Do,” FED. LAW., June 2015, at 45–46 (explaining that 
these statutes allow individuals to deny people services, goods, or accommodations if doing so 
would be contrary to their religious beliefs). 
 139. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx#RFRA 
[https://perma.cc/M2V6-HBEB]. 
 140. Those states are Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. Id. 
 141. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id. 
 142. Steve Sanders, RFRAs and Reasonableness, 91 IND. L.J. 243, 243 (2016). 
 143. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (finding a 
violation of the federal RFRA). 
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In states with antidiscrimination statutes, an RFRA may create 
confusion, as a state’s RFRA and its antidiscrimination statutes could 
conflict. For example, a state may prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation (via statute) and simultaneously protect the right of its citizens 
to deny goods or services to homosexuals if that denial is rooted in 
religious beliefs (via an RFRA). However, blue states have found that the 
antidiscrimination statutes trump the RFRAs.144 In red states, however, it 
appears that—notwithstanding antidiscrimination statutes—at least some 
discrimination may be acceptable to the extent it is based on religion: 
eleven states have enacted religious-freedom bills that allow child-
placement agencies to discriminate against certain individuals if placing 
the child with those individuals would be against the agencies’ religious 
beliefs.145 These states specifically allow these agencies to discriminate, 
so there is no confusion about which statute trumps. 
Due to its recency, Tennessee’s RFRA is particularly noteworthy. 
Signed in January of this year, Tennessee’s new law assures continued 
taxpayer funding to faith-based child-placement agencies, even if those 
agencies exclude LGBT families.146 The law also provides legal 
protection to agencies who so discriminate.147 Bill Lee, the Republican 
governor who signed the bill into law, has cited his Christianity several 
times during his term. Governor Lee deemed the defense of religious 
liberty “very important.”148 Tennessee’s new law is but one example 
illustrating an overarching theme: Red and blue states produce varying 
results of the same situation simply because their public policies—
heavily influenced by religion or the lack thereof—are founded upon 
significantly different core beliefs. 
  
 
 144. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 928–29 (Cal. 1996) 
(finding that the federal RFRA did not allow housing discrimination against unmarried couples); 
Gallo v. Salesian Soc., Inc., 676 A.2d 580, 593–94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (finding the 
RFRA did not allow employment discrimination based on sex). 
 145. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10D-2 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5322 (2020); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 710.23g (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-8-112 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 26-6-38 (2018); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.004 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1709.3 (2019). Georgia has attempted to pass similar legislation. See, e.g., S.B. 375, 154th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018); see also Amanda C. Coyne & Maya T. Prabhu, Fight Over Same-
Sex Adoptions Returns to Georgia Legislature, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/adoption-bill-would-allow-georgia-agencies-refuse-same-sex-
couples/OYBnkqsjpb7hYcMJ2bxunO/ [https://perma.cc/32EL-BUZ6] (reporting on a newly 
proposed Georgia Senate bill which would “allow agencies to refuse to place children with same-
sex couples or those whose religious beliefs don’t align with the organization’s mission”). 
 146. Kimberlee Kruesi, Tennessee Governor Signs Anti-Gay Adoption Bill, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/977036e1758690e0473ce2665ada8b7d [https://perma 
.cc/8WY8-S833].  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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B.  The Court of Public Opinion: Elected Judges and the Influence of 
State Policies 
These divergent views on LGBT issues, ART, and religion may 
influence the way judges rule on important issues. When judges are 
elected, rather than appointed, they can be swayed by their constituents’ 
opinions—since the judges seek reelection.149 This is especially true 
when it comes to issues about which the public has strong opinions.150 
Thus, an elected judge may be influenced by her constituents’ views on 
LGBT issues, ART, and religion. Twenty-nine states elect their judges, 
while the remaining states appoint them;151 42% of blue states, compared 
to 68% of red states, use elections rather than judicial appointment.152 
In red states, elected judges may (likely) be influenced by the opinion 
of the majority of voters in their state: Christian Republicans. This means 
that judges may adhere to Christian-Republican opinions on LGBT 
issues. As discussed above, there is a correlation between red states and 
less rights for LGBT individuals.153 Additionally, many Christians 
disapprove of homosexuality and therefore disfavor granting LGBT 
individuals more rights or legal protection.154 Based on these facts, judges 
 
 149. See  Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding 
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 766 
(1995) (discussing the likelihood that an elected judge will overturn a jury-imposed death 
penalty); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 
739, 756 (2018) (pointing out that judges are not immune to political forces); Shepherd, supra 
note 3, at 171 (finding that state supreme court judges often vote in line with the stereotypical 
preferences of the retention agents). But see Melanie Kalmanson, Neither the Problem nor the 
Solution Lies Solely with the Judiciary: Response to Robertson’s Judicial Impartiality in a 
Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. F. 88, 88–89 (2018) (arguing that judicial decision-making does 
not always produce results that align with a judge’s perceived political beliefs). 
 150. See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 485 (2010).  
 151. RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT 
ORGANIZATION, 2011, at 6 map 4 (2013). 
 152. See id. (indicating that eight blue states hold elections for their judges, and the 
remaining eleven appoint their judges, while twenty-one red states elect their judges, and the 
remaining ten appoint them). 
 153. See discussion supra Section II.A.1. 
 154. For an example of Christian disfavor of homosexuality, which recently appeared before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Christian baker refused to bake a wedding cake for 
a same-sex couple. Id. at 1723. This became a fight over religious freedom and the state’s 
antidiscrimination act. Id. While the Court did not decide whether religious freedom would trump 
statutes that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation, id. at 1732 (ruling instead on 
the facts of the case that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated its duty to apply laws in 
a manner neutral toward religion), this case is a prime example of how Christians believe same-
sex marriage is abhorrent to their religion. This baker went so far as to say he would have closed 
his bakery over being forced to bake wedding cakes for same-sex couples. Queer Voices, Jack 
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in red states are more likely to rule—generally speaking—against LGBT 
individuals than are their judicial counterparts in blue states. Essentially, 
the data show that whether a state’s citizens are majority red or majority 
blue tends to influence whether an elected judge rules according to red 
principles or blue principles. A judge seeking reelection—and a judge 
who wins an election—likely rules in a way that reflects the voters’ 
views. Citizens in red states are thus more likely to see their own 
principles espoused from the bench: Almost 70% of red states elect their 
judges, compared to less than 50% of blue states.155  
C.  Implicit Bias Shapes Judicial Opinion 
While judges are viewed as impartial decisionmakers, they can be 
swayed by both overt influences—like public opinion and explicit bias—
and influences that are more insidious, like implicit bias. Unlike explicit 
bias, implicit bias silently affects people’s decisions and attitudes.156 The 
person with the implicit bias may not even recognize it,157 and for this 
reason, implicit bias is especially dangerous.  
Implicit bias can be as simple as favoring what is familiar.158 In 
general, people are biased in favor of those who are similar to them and 
biased against people who are dissimilar.159 One study of judges across 
the country provides evidence that judges are no exception. This study 
found that Protestant and Catholic judges are more likely to be biased 
against Jews.160 These same judges are also more likely to be biased in 
favor of Christians.161 This lends support to the conclusion that judges are 
more likely to rule in favor of individuals who are like them than for 
individuals who are unlike them. The majority of state judges are white, 
heterosexual men;162 these classifications show who these judges will be 
biased for and against. 
 
Phillips, Masterpiece Cakeshop Owner, Says He’d Rather Go to Jail Than Make Gay Wedding 
Cake, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2013, 2:01 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
12/10/jack-phillips-gay-wedding-cake_n_4420252.html [https://perma.cc/XY4J-MGPU]. 
 155. See MALEGA & COHEN, supra note 151, at 6 map 4. 
 156. See Asha Amin, Note, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom and the Need for Reform, 30 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 575, 575 (2017). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Stephen M. Feldman, Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 47 (2006). 
 159. See id. 
 160. Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial 
Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 107 (2017). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., DEMOGRAPHIC DATA PROVIDED BY JUSTICES AND 
JUDGES RELATIVE TO GENDER, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER IDENTITY/SEXUAL ORIENTATION 1–
2 (2016); TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y OF LAW & POLICY, 
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III.  PERTINENT INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINES163 
If key differences between red and blue states influence judges in 
those states, then those same differences necessarily impact will 
interpretation and construction—processes that require judges to either 
understand the meaning of, or ascribe meaning to, the terms and 
provisions of testamentary documents in order to reach a decision. It 
seems self-evident that before a court imposes a consequence on a 
property owner’s testamentary wishes—as articulated through a will or 
trust agreement—there should be a normative basis for making the 
imposition and preferring particular consequences of the law as well as a 
normative guide for applying these processes. Indeed, a substantive 
analysis concerning the consequences of the interpretation and 
construction of testamentary provisions can only follow an introduction 
to this guide. Therefore, this Part offers an elementary overview of the 
foundational purposes and underlying principles of judicial interpretation 
and construction of estate planning instruments. With that grounding, it 
becomes possible to explore the application of the interpretation and 
construction doctrines to testamentary dispositions. 
A.  Foundational Purpose and Principle of the Laws of Succession 
A substantive analysis of the judicial interpretation and construction 
doctrines must begin with an elementary overview of the basic principles 
of wills and trusts. An appreciation of these principles is necessary to 
understand interpretation and construction application to estate planning 
instruments. 
The purpose of the laws of succession is simple: in a private property 
system, there must be a procedure to facilitate the transfer of an 
individual’s private property upon death.164 The very existence of private 
property thus perpetuates the need for the laws of succession. As 
Professor Richard T. Ely stated in 1914, the laws of succession advance 
the “continuation of the régime of private property as dominant in the 
 
THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 7 figs.6 & 7 (2016) (showing that 
57% of state trial court judges and 58% of state appellate court judges are white men). Sexual 
orientation data on state judges is not readily available, but California does publish this data. See 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra, at 2. In California, 1.3% of state judges are lesbian, 1.5% are 
gay, 0.1% are bisexual, and 0.1% are transgender. Id. California is one of the states that embraces 
inclusion and protection of LGBT individuals, so the number of LGBT judges in California is 
likely higher than in other states.  
 163. For convenience, this Article discusses construction issues in terms of wills, but these 
approaches apply equally to trusts. 
 164. John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 
502 (1977). 
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social order.”165 Embedded within this notion of private property and the 
orderly transfer thereof is the principle that individuals have the freedom 
(or right) to control the disposition of their property during life and at 
death.166 American society has long recognized the value inherent in 
protecting an individual’s ability to acquire and transfer private 
property.167 Testamentary freedom is derived from this well-established 
property right and, accordingly, is the governing principle underlying 
American succession law.168 Just as individuals have the right to 
 
 165. 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF WEALTH 425 (1914) (listing this as one of four aims of the distribution of wealth through the 
laws of inheritance); accord Gaubatz, supra note 164, at 501–03 (expounding on this policy goal 
of succession law). 
    166. See Gaubatz, supra note 164, at 503. The right of a property owner to direct the 
disposition of property upon her death is commonly known as “testamentary freedom.” See Daniel 
B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2013). Rationales for testamentary freedom vary, and many theories have 
been proffered in support for the principle of this theory—some widely accepted, others 
controversial. See e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead 
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1992) (noting the variety among arguments for testamentary freedom); 
Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109, 
116 (2006) (providing a detailed discussion on the scope and limitations of testamentary freedom). 
The most fundamental “rationale for testamentary freedom is that, in a society based on the theory 
of private property, the freedom of testation might be the least objectionable arrangement for 
dealing with property succession at the testator’s death.” Tritt, supra at 117; see Hirsch & Wang, 
supra, at 5–14. Others argue that robust testamentary freedom is natural, creates happiness, 
promotes wealth accumulation, encourages industry, creativity and productivity, reinforces family 
ties, promotes responsibility, and allows the testator to adapt to the needs and circumstances of 
his particular family. See Tritt, supra at 117. Each rationale has its proponents and skeptics, but 
the very breadth of jurisprudential and pragmatic justifications for testamentary freedom is, in 
itself, a testament to why this concept is at the core of Anglo-American succession law. 
 167. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: 
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340 (describing the history of testamentary 
freedom and the disposition of private property in American law). 
 168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The organizing principle of the American law of donative 
transfers is freedom of disposition.”); Ronald Chester, Inheritance in American Legal Thought, in 
INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 23, 23 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 
1998); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES 
AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, 
Jr. ed., 1977) (“It is often said that the principle of freedom of testation dominates the law of the 
United States.”); Tritt, supra note 166, at 111 (“Testamentary freedom . . . is the hallmark 
principle of estates law.”). However, some scholars are skeptical concerning the actual deference 
paid to testamentary freedom in American estates law because of potentially biased results from 
postmortem will contests. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 243 (1996) (theorizing that courts validate wills on the basis of whether 
testators bequeath their property to their biological family members rather than to nonrelatives); 
see also Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1997) (arguing 
that “the undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who deviate from 
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accumulate, consume, and transfer personal property during life, 
individuals generally are—and should be—free to control the disposition 
of personal property at death.169 Thus, testamentary freedom can be 
viewed simply as one stick in the bundle of rights referred to as property 
rights.170  
In addition, although the U.S. Constitution does not speak specifically 
about testamentary freedom as a property right, a robust public policy 
favoring testamentary freedom has been fostered in America.171 For 
example, states’ probate codes have placed very limited restrictions on 
the testator’s ability to transfer property (mainly, a surviving spouse’s 
elective share often acts as the greatest restriction);172 Article III, Section 
Three of the U.S. Constitution prohibits corruption of blood as 
punishment for treason;173 the vast majority of the states have abolished 
the Rule in Shelley’s Case;174 and there is a growing trend in the United 
States of abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities.175 These examples 
tend to demonstrate a strong public policy of favoring testamentary 
freedom. 
In the United States, there are generally three ways to implement the 
disposition and transfer of private property at death: wills, will-
 
judicially imposed testamentary norms”). In addition to undue influence, some other legal 
doctrines potentially check testamentary freedom as well. See, e.g., Tritt, supra note 166, at 112.   
 169. See Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 129, 160 (2008) (explaining that testamentary freedom extends the concept of absolute 
property ownership beyond the grave). 
 170. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (stating that the right to transmit wealth 
at death is a separate, identifiable stick in the bundle of rights called property). 
 171. See Friedman, supra note 168, at 14. 
 172. See Tritt, supra note 166, at 133. 
 173. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, Congress extended 
the prohibition on corruption of blood to all federal crimes then existing. See Crimes Act of 1790, 
ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 177; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982) (“No conviction or judgment shall 
work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate.”). But see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2018)) (repealing, 
inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982)). 
 174. See C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rule in Shelley’s Case, 99 A.L.R. 
2d 1161 (1965) (“In the great majority of American jurisdictions, the rule in Shelley’s Case has 
been abolished, wholly or in part, by express statutory provisions of various wording and effect.”). 
 175. See ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 4 (10th ed. 
2017); Marc S. Bekerman & Gerry W. Beyer, Trusts and Estates Practice into the Next 
Millennium, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 7, 9. 
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substitutes,176 and intestacy statutes.177 While wills, will-substitutes, and 
intestacy statutes differ in a variety of ways, each provides a possible 
means of implementing the principle of effectuating the decedent’s intent. 
For purposes of this Article, we will discuss wills and trusts—both 
written manifestations of the testator’s alleged intent. 
B.  Interpretation and Construction 
Interpretation and construction are the two pillars upon which 
testamentary freedom stands. Interpretation is the process of “discovering 
the meaning or the intention of the testator from permissible data.”178 
Construction is the process of assigning meaning to the instrument when 
the testator’s intention cannot be fully ascertained from the proper 
sources.179 Interpretation aims to uncover the donor’s actual intention, 
whereas the rules of construction or constructional preferences attribute 
intention.180 Historically, construction has been employed only when 
interpretation failed.181  
When a valid testamentary document comes before a court, the 
fiduciary must manage and distribute the assets according to the terms of 
the governing instrument.182 This implicates construction procedures—
 
176. Basically, a will-substitute is the functional equivalent of a will executed during life. For 
example, revocable inter vivos trusts, contracts, life insurance, pension plans, and joint accounts 
are all will-substitutes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
177. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 175, at 63–65; Erin J. Hoyle, Student Work, 
Including the Frozen Heir: Expanding the Florida Probate Code to Include Posthumously 
Conceived Children's Inheritance Rights, 43 STETSON L. REV. 325, 332 (2014). 
 178. ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 146, at 809. 
 179. Id. at 809–10. 
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.2 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 181. See id. § 11.3 cmt. c. 
 182. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 3-703 (2020); cf. Trustee, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[A] trustee’s duties are . . . to protect and preserve the trust 
property, and to ensure that it is employed . . . in accordance with the directions contained in the 
trust instrument.”). American society has long recognized the value in protecting an individual’s 
ability to acquire and transfer property. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. The principle 
of donative freedom, the governing principle underlying American succession law, provides that 
individuals have the freedom to control the disposition of their property at death. See supra notes 
168–175 and accompanying text. Any succession law disputes that arise from Obergefell should 
be viewed through this lens. For a discussion concerning the importance of the principle, see Tritt, 
Sperms and Estates, supra note 97, at 374–76. See also Lee-ford Tritt, Online Essay, Dispatches 
from the Trenches of America’s Great Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 752–54 (2014) 
(discussing the diversity of ways in which trusts can serve a settlor’s intent); Lee-ford Tritt, The 
Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2587–
88, 2598–601 (2011) (discussing the role of trusts in effectuating donative intent and furthering 
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the process of determining the meaning that should be attributed to wills 
and trusts—which are “applied to persons and property as they exist at 
the testator’s death.”183 As one court noted, testamentary document 
construction is governed by “two overriding rules[:] . . . to avoid doing 
any violence to the words employed in the instrument . . . [and] to 
effectuate the testator’s intent.”184  
Rules of construction, as well as constructional preferences, set out 
the process by which the meaning of terms and provisions in testamentary 
documents are to be resolved. While rules of construction offer 
“particular results for particular recurring situations,”185 “constructional 
preferences are more general principles upon which the specific rules are 
based.”186 For example, a traditional rule of construction is the doctrine 
of worthier title, which nullifies an inter vivos conveyance to the 
conveyor’s “heirs” because such a conveyance does not designate a 
conveyee.187 On the other hand, a prototypical constructional preference 
is that donative instruments be construed in accordance with public 
policy.188 Although the rules of construction address a multitude of 
specific issues, each rule is premised on the overarching common goal of 
effectuating the testator’s intent above all else. “Rules of construction are 
highly specific, rebuttable presumptions that dictate the meaning of 
particular terms in the will or the application of those terms to well-
defined factual scenarios . . . .”189 In the hypotheticals explored below, 
however, “well-defined factual scenarios” have yet to be developed  and 
there are no rules of construction or constructional preferences directly 
on point.190 
 
the principle of donative freedom); Tritt, Technical Correction, supra note 97, at 289 (discussing 
the difficulties of effectuating donative intent through intestacy). 
 183. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IOWA L. 
REV. 971, 984 (1965). 
 184. In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).  
 185. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills and Trusts, 
52 CALIF. L. REV. 921, 923 (1964).  
 186. Lee-ford Tritt, The Stranger-to-the-Marriage Doctrine: Judicial Construction Issues 
Post-Obergefell, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 373, 378 (2019). 
 187. See Harold E. Verrall, The Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Questionable Rule of 
Construction, 6 UCLA L. REV. 371, 372 (1959). The rule of worthier title has been relaxed since 
its inception in feudal England; a gift to “heirs” will be upheld if no good reason requires its 
frustration. Id. at 373.  
 188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 189. Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction Between Will 
Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 81 (2005). 
 190. Id. 
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In general, American succession law embraces freedom of 
disposition,191 which dictates that “[t]he controlling consideration in 
determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s 
intention.”192 Therefore, when a testamentary instrument is construed 
under these rules, the donor’s intentions are given effect to the maximum 
extent allowed under the law.193 The testator’s intent at the time of the 
testamentary instrument’s execution is controlling.194 When applying a 
rule of construction, the applicable rule will be considered together with 
available proof of the individual testator’s actual intent.195 Since the rules 
aim to carry out testamentary intent by presuming what the average, 
similarly situated donor would desire, any party claiming that the donor’s 
actual intent differs from that prescribed by a rule of construction will 
bear the burden of proof.196  
Although effectuating intent is the primary objective of the 
construction process, the adherence to testamentary intent is sometimes 
difficult to achieve. Thus, courts dealing with the laws of succession are 
often compelled to analyze individual facets of the constructions in 
question to derive their ultimate meaning. Simply put, intent is not always 
clear. If donors’ wishes cannot be clearly ascertained, these rules and 
preferences “attribute intention to individual donors in particular 
circumstances on the basis of common intention.”197 In other words, 
courts apply rules of construction in an attempt to implement the typical 
testator’s probable intent.198 Since the rules of construction and 
constructional preferences only presume intent, they can be rebutted 
where proof of an alternative testamentary intention is found.199  
 
 191. See, e.g., Gerald L. Greene & Michael J. Schmitt, Note, The Dilemma of Adoptees in 
the Class Gift Structure—The Kentucky Approach: A Rule Without Reason, 59 KY. L.J. 921, 925 
(1971) (“In attempting to determine the meaning of language in private instruments the intent of 
the transferor is of primary importance.”). 
 192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Halbach, supra note 183, at 984. 
 195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 196. See id. § 11.3 cmt. a. 
 197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. 
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003).  
 198. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. 643, 646 (2014). 
 199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3 cmt. 
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). Testamentary documents may, at times, present issues to which no 
specific rule of construction applies. In such cases, more general constructional preferences will 
be used in clarifying the ambiguity. Id. § 11.3(b). Unlike a specific rule of construction which 
applies only to a particular type of ambiguity, constructional preferences provide broader 
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When addressing a testamentary document, what is “permissible 
data”200—data the trier of fact can consider—will depend on whether the 
language of the document is ambiguous. Where ambiguous or mistaken 
language obscures the testator’s actual intent, courts have traditionally 
applied two interrelated rules of construction—the plain meaning rule 
and the no reformation rule. Adherence to the plain meaning rule is 
sometimes referred to as “strict construction.”201 However, modern 
courts increasingly repudiate these approaches and tend to allow both 
reformation and the introduction of extrinsic evidence. This is sometimes 
referred to as “liberal construction”; extrinsic evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances at the time of the will’s execution is admitted without first 
resorting to the rules of construction.202 
1.  The Traditional Plain Meaning and No Reformation Rules 
The practice of applying testamentary intent begins, as with many 
areas of law, with the plain meaning of the testator’s words.203 Under the 
“plain meaning” or “no-extrinsic-evidence”204 rule, the plain meaning of 
a will cannot be disturbed by the introduction of extrinsic evidence to 
prove that another meaning was intended.205 In essence, the plain 
 
guidelines which can be used to resolve various ambiguities. Id. § 11.3 cmt. b. Significant 
constructional preferences include the following: the preference for construction that accords with 
common intention, which is a foundational preference from which other subsidiary preferences 
are derived; the preference for construction that accords with the testator’s general dispositive 
plan; the preference for construction that renders the document as effective as possible; the 
preference for construction that favors family over non-family, favors close family members over 
more remote family members, and does not disinherit a line of descent; and the preference for 
construction that is more in accord with public policy than other potential constructions. Id. 
§ 11.3(c). Alternately, more than one rule of construction or constructional preference may be 
relevant to resolving a particular provision within a testamentary instrument. Id. § 11.3 cmt. b. 
Where all rules and preferences prescribe the same result, that result is merely more difficult to 
rebut. Id. § 11.3 cmt. d. Where conflicting rules and preferences apply, however, they may 
neutralize each other, or the trier of fact may decide that one is weightier than the other, in which 
case the “most persuasive in the circumstances” prevails. Id. § 11.3(b) cmt. d. 
 200. ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 146, at 809. 
 201. Storrow, supra note 189, at 71.  
 202. Id. at 73–74 (citing ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 146, at 808). 
 203. In re Clark, 417 S.E.2d 856, 857 (S.C. 1992) (“A will must be read in the ordinary and 
grammatical sense of the words employed, unless some obvious absurdity, repugnancy, or 
inconsistency with the declared intention of the testator, as abstracted from the whole will, should 
follow from such construction.”).  
 204. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 26, at 521. The plain meaning rule is sometimes 
called the no-extrinsic-evidence rule since it “prescribes that courts not receive evidence about 
the testator’s intent ‘apart from, in addition to, or in opposition to the legal effect of the language 
which is used by him in the will itself.’” Id. (quoting WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, 
PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 32.9, at 270 (rev. ed. 1961)). 
 205. See id.; Sitkoff, supra note 198, at 651. 
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meaning of a testator’s expressions usually controls, and courts are 
sometimes reluctant to look outside of a testamentary instrument to define 
actual intent. Put simply, a testator’s words mean what they plainly say.206 
However, this doctrine involves some subjectivity—what is “plain” to 
one judge may not be plain to another—and the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence hinges on a particular judge’s understanding of a term’s “plain 
meaning.”  
Under the closely related “no reformation” rule, courts may not 
reform a will to reflect what the testator intended to, but did not, say. 
Instead, a court must interpret the words the testator actually used and 
cannot provide its own words to correct the testator’s mistakes.207 Though 
courts generally refuse to correct mistakes, courts often strike erroneous 
language in misdescription cases—an exception to the mistake rule.208  
2.  Exceptions to the Bar on Extrinsic Evidence 
Although the “no-extrinsic-evidence” rule generally applies to 
construction and interpretation issues, there are some noteworthy 
exceptions to this general rule. Accordingly, a brief overview of the more 
pertinent exceptions are in order. 
i.  Ambiguities 
Traditionally, extrinsic evidence was admissible only if the evidence 
went to the validity of the will or if the will itself was ambiguous.209 An 
ambiguity implies more than one meaning of a single word or phrase.210 
Latent ambiguities may arise when the terms used in the will 
 
 206. See In re Stephens’ Will, 238 N.W. 900, 903 (Wis. 1931) (Fairchild, J., dissenting) 
(“[N]o rule of construction is more effective to discover the testator's intention than that which 
requires that words shall be given their plain and ordinary meaning. The words used by the testator 
in this instance are final and comprehensive.”); see also May v. Riley, 305 S.E.2d 77, 78 (S.C. 
1983) (“The cardinal rule of will construction is that the testator’s intent should be ascertained 
and given effect.”). 
 207. Sanderson v. Norcross, 136 N.E. 170, 172 (Mass. 1922) (“Courts have no power to 
reform wills. . . . [M]istakes of testators cannot be corrected. Omissions cannot be supplied. 
Language cannot be modified to meet unforeseen changes in conditions. The only means for 
ascertaining the intent of the testator are the words written and the acts done by him.”); Sitkoff, 
supra note 198, at 651. 
 208. Storrow, supra note 189, at 78. 
 209. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ Errors: The 
Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 12 & n.52, 14 (1990); Halbach, supra note 
183, at 975. 
 210. See Ambiguity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An uncertainty of meaning 
based . . . on a semantic dichotomy that gives rise to any of two or more quite different but almost 
equally plausible interpretations.”). 
 
2020] LITIGATION BLUES FOR RED-STATE TRUSTS 877 
 
insufficiently describe the testator’s intended disposition or bequest.211 In 
other words, latent ambiguities only arise when other sources besides the 
testamentary document are before the court.212 For example, a testator’s 
bequest giving “my entire estate to my cousin Benny” does not initially 
appear ambiguous. However, if the testator has two cousins, both named 
Benny, there is a latent ambiguity.213 
While extrinsic evidence may be “generally inadmissible to add to, 
vary, or contradict language used in a will,” it may be admitted by courts 
to “explain a latent ambiguity.”214 Importantly, extrinsic evidence may 
also be used to raise the issue of latent ambiguity, not just to resolve the 
ambiguity once the court recognizes its existence.215 Thus, the same 
extrinsic evidence can raise and subsequently resolve a latent ambiguity. 
Latent ambiguities typically take one of three forms: (1) equivocation, 
where two or more persons or things fit the description exactly (like 
cousin Benny); (2) personal usage, where the testator habitually used a 
term in an idiosyncratic manner; or (3) misdescription, where a 
description in the will does not exactly fit any person or thing.216 
ii.  Identifications 
Regardless of how plain the document’s language may be, extrinsic 
evidence is permissible to make identifications; a testator’s intent cannot 
be given meaning unless courts can “make connections between the 
words and the actual persons and property to which they refer” through 
the use of extrinsic evidence.217 A failed identification would traditionally 
reveal either an equivocation or personal usage latent ambiguity.218 The 
interpretation of the document does not preclude identifications, 
however.219 The requirement of a finding of ambiguity before admitting 
extrinsic evidence protects against the invention of ambiguities where 
 
 211. See Weatherhead v. Sewell, 28 Tenn. 272, 295 (1848). 
 212. See Higgins v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 62 So. 774, 774 (Ala. 1913). 
 213. In contrast to latent ambiguities, which do not initially appear ambiguous, patent 
ambiguities are revealed on the face of the will. Weatherhead, 28 Tenn. at 295. So, instead of two 
cousins named Benny, a patent ambiguity would bequest “four-thirds of my estate to Benny.” The 
confusion and impossibility of the gift is apparent from its face. 
 214. Stickley v. Carmichael, 850 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tenn. 1992). 
 215. In re Estate of Bernstrauch, 313 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Neb. 1981) (citing authorities that 
hold that “extrinsic evidence is admissible both to disclose and to remove the latent ambiguity of 
the will”). 
 216. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 175, at 333–34. 
 217. Storrow, supra note 189, at 75; 80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 1098. 
 218. See Storrow, supra note 189, at 76. 
 219. See id. at 77. 
 
878 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
they do not already exist. Identifications do not create ambiguities; rather, 
they merely expose existing latent ambiguities.220  
Because the testator’s intent at the time of the document’s execution 
controls, events after the execution of the will may be irrelevant.221 
However, a reaction or a failure to react to events following the execution 
of a will may constitute permissible evidence to resolve latent ambiguities 
that arise in attempting to identify beneficiaries.222 
3.  Modern Construction Trends 
The modern trend of probate courts repudiates distinguishing between 
patent and latent ambiguities, the plain meaning rule, and the no 
reformation rule.223 As early as 1898, some scholars criticized as “an 
unprofitable subtlety” the distinction between patent ambiguities, for 
which extrinsic evidence was not admissible, and latent ambiguities, for 
which it was.224 Today, the distinction carries little weight and is often 
ignored or expressly rejected.225 Distinguishing between types of 
ambiguities that allow or preclude the introduction of extrinsic evidence 
is perhaps a moot point under modern estates law because the modern 
trend generally rejects the no reformation rule, rendering ambiguity 
superfluous where mistake exists. The no reformation rule establishes a 
conclusive presumption of correctness for the words used in a duly 
executed will and thus protects against the finding of a contrived 
“mistake.”226 However, the rule also denies relief when there is an actual 
mistake, even where there is evidence of mistake and of the testator’s 
actual intent.227 More forgiving courts began to correct wills under the 
pretense of allowing extrinsic evidence to construe supposedly 
ambiguous terms, which has been characterized as “expressly 
 
 220. See id. at 76–77. For example, when a testator bequeaths a gift to “my cousin,” the court 
is responsible for identifying who the cousin is. Moreover, a gift to a cousin is facially valid: there 
is no patent ambiguity. However, if in the process of identifying the “cousin,” the court discovers 
that the testator has two cousins, the identification process reveals the latent ambiguity attendant 
to the word “cousin.” 
 221. Halbach, supra note 183, at 984. 
 222. See id. 
 223. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust 
Law at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1885–86 (2000). 
 224. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 26, at 530 n.28 (quoting J.B. THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 424 (1898)). 
 225. Halbach, supra note 223, at 1885. 
 226. Sitkoff, supra note 198, at 651. 
 227. Id. 
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disclaim[ing]”228 the plain meaning rule 229 as well as moving away from 
the no reformation rule. Today, the Uniform Probate Code, the 
Restatement (Third) of Property, and several courts allow the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence to both clarify and reform the terms of 
a will.230  
4.  Interpretation and Construction of Trusts 
Many of the same interpretation and construction principles applied 
to wills carry over to trusts. When interpreting a trust agreement, a 
settlor’s clear intent will not be disregarded to accommodate a 
beneficiary’s subsequent actions.231 However, equitable deviation may be 
permitted where following the terms of the trust agreement would defeat 
settlor’s intent.232 Pursuant to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a court 
may modify a distributive provision of a private trust or permit the trustee 
to deviate from a distributive provision if, because of circumstances not 
anticipated by the settlor, the deviation will further the purposes of the 
trust.233 
The granting of equitable deviation should not disregard the intention 
of the settlor but should rather “give effect to what the settlor’s intent 
probably would have been had the circumstances in question been 
anticipated.”234 Changed circumstances are not necessarily required—
“[i]t is sufficient that the settlor was unaware of the circumstances in 
establishing the terms of the trust.”235 If the person seeking equitable 
deviation shows changed circumstances, or that relevant circumstances 
were unknown to the settlor at the creation of the trust, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the party claiming the settlor anticipated the 
circumstances.236 A failure to provide for subsequent developments 
 
 228. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 26, at 521. 
 229. See, e.g., In re Estate of Taff, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 737, 739–41 (Ct. App. 1976); Engle v. 
Siegel, 377 A.2d 892, 893–94 (N.J. 1977); Arnheiter v. Arnheiter, 125 A.2d 914, 915 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1956) (construing “No. 304 Harrison Avenue” to mean “No. 317 Harrison Avenue”); 
In re Gibb’s Estate, 111 N.W.2d 413, 415–18 (Wis. 1961) (construing “Robert J. Krause” to mean 
“Robert W. Krause”). 
 230. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 231. Tritt, Granddaughter, supra note 1; see, e.g., In re Dezell’s Will, 194 N.W.2d 190, 191–
92 (Minn. 1972) (holding that, absent evidence of settlor’s intent to the contrary, the beneficiary 
could still take under the testamentary trust despite her divorce from the settlor’s son following 
the settlor’s death). 
 232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 233. Id. § 66. 
 234. Id. § 66 cmt. a. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. § 66 cmt. b. 
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“reinforces an inference that the circumstances were not anticipated by 
the settlor.”237 Once the court has determined that there are changed or 
unanticipated circumstances, the court must still determine whether a 
proposed deviation would tend to advance the trust’s purposes and the 
settlor’s intent.238 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY AND TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM  
With great testamentary freedom comes great “dead hand” control. 
Wills and trusts allow testators to impose conditions on beneficiaries 
from beyond the grave, but the extent of these conditions are limited by 
public policy.239 Thus, where a state’s public policy leans red or blue, the 
line dividing violative from acceptable conditions tends to be drawn 
according to the corresponding red or blue principles. According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Donative Transfers), the 
donor’s intent is controlling when a court determines the meaning of a 
donative document.240 A court’s primary objective is to honor the 
testator’s intent to the maximum extent allowed by law—not to question 
the testator’s fairness, wisdom, or reasonableness in his disposition of 
property.241 However, when a testator attempts to control or influence a 
beneficiary’s intimate life choices, or disrupt his family relationships,242 
courts will strike down these provisions as void against public policy.243 
Key areas where red and blue states diverge—LGBT issues, ART, and 
religion—often relate closely to intimate life choices or family 
relationships and thus to public policy decisions.  
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that the 
donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted by an 
overriding rule of law.”).  
 240. Id. § 10.1.  
 241. Christina V. Bonfanti, Note, ‘Till [My Parents’] Death Do Us Part: Exposing 
Testamentary Restrictions Placed on Marriages that Perpetuate Prejudice, 14 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 357, 360 (2008). 
 242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (AM. LAW INST. 
1983) (“An otherwise effective provision in a donative transfer which is designed to permit the 
acquisition or retention of an interest in property only in the event of either the continuance of an 
existing separation or the creation of a future separation of a family relationship, other than that 
of husband and wife, is invalid where the dominant motive of the transferor was to promote such 
a separation.”).  
 243. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1315, 1317 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2003) 
(“A trust or a condition or other provision in the terms of a trust is ordinarily . . . invalid if it tends 
to encourage disruption of a family relationship or to discourage formation or resumption of such 
a relationship.”).  
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States have recognized public policies in support of broad 
testamentary freedom;244 however, testamentary bequests that impose 
restrictions on marriage or religion, or promote divorce, are among the 
most controversial.245 The concern with public policy is that “courts have 
failed to establish a formulaic approach for determining what the public 
policy is, where it comes from, and what testamentary restrictions might 
be declared void or valid through its overreaching grasp.”246 Generally, 
courts will protect a testator’s right to dispose of the testator’s property 
as the testator wishes “while drawing a line at complete or almost total 
restraints on marriage, encouragements of divorce, or invitations for a 
court to enter nonjusticiable religious controversies.”247  
Although detailing the history, principles, and applications of public 
policy regarding such restraints, encouragements, and invitations lies 
outside the scope of this Article, the summary account that follows 
provides a strong platform upon which to build. 
A.  Marriage  
Testamentary bequests that impose restrictions on marriage may be 
deemed void against public policy. In determining whether a 
testamentary restriction on marriage is void, courts have analyzed 
whether the restriction was a total restraint on marriage or a partial 
restraint on marriage. Total restraints on marriage are void as a matter of 
public policy, while partial restraints on marriage may be upheld 
depending on a court’s reasoning. This Part further explains how courts 
have viewed these types of restrictions. 
1.  Total Restraints on Marriage 
Testators may impose restraints or conditions on marriage in a variety 
of ways,248 but total restraints on marriage are contrary to public policy 
 
 244. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. 2009); In re Am. Comm. 
for the Wiezmann Inst. of Sci. v. Dunn, 883 N.E.2d 996, 1002 (N.Y. 2008).  
 245. See Scalise, supra note 243, at 1327. 
 246. Christopher T. Elmore, Public Policy or Political Correctness: Addressing the Dilemma 
of Applying Public Policy to Inheritance Issues, 2 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 199, 201 
(2009).  
 247. Aaron H. Kaplan, Note, The “Jewish Clause” and Public Policy: Preserving the 
Testamentary Right to Oppose Religious Intermarriage, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 303 
(2010).  
 248. Scalise, supra note 243, at 1327 (“The jurisprudence, in fact, provides examples of cases 
in which a testator imposes a condition prohibiting all marriage, prohibiting marriage at a 
particular time, prohibiting or encouraging marriage to a particular person or kind of person, or 
requiring or encouraging divorce, if one is already married.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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and thus void.249 The Restatement (Second) of Property states:  
An otherwise effective restriction in a donative transfer 
designed to prevent the acquisition or retention of an interest 
in the event of some, but not all, first marriages of the 
transferee is valid if, and only if, under the circumstances, 
the restraint does not unreasonably limit the transferee’s 
opportunity to marry. If the restriction is invalid, the 
donative transfer takes effect as though the restriction had 
not been imposed.250  
Examples of total restraints on marriage are provisions that require the 
beneficiary to never marry or to not remarry after becoming a widow.251 
For example, in the very early case of Maddox v. Maddox,252 the 
testator devised a portion of his estate to his daughter, “during her single 
life, and forever, if her conduct should be orderly, and she remain a 
member of Friends Society.”253 The rules of the Friends Society provided 
that a member would be expelled if the member married out of the 
society;254 therefore, the provision restricted the testator’s daughter to 
only marrying a member of the society. Given that there were no more 
than five or six male members of the society within the area, the court 
held that the provision was an undue and unreasonable restraint upon the 
choice of marriage.255 In addition to holding the provision void as against 
public policy, the court also recognized and adhered to the idea that 
marriage is in the best interests of society and should be encouraged.256 
In support of this view, comment j to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
§ 29 states:  
 
 249. WILLIAM H. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.25 (William J. Bowe & Douglas 
H. Parker eds., 2005); Meelad Hanna, Note, Discriminatory Strings Attached: Reining in the 
Testator’s Intent in Conditioning Will and Trust Bequests, 25 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 331, 336 
(2014); Jeremy Macklin, Comment, The Puzzling Case of Max Feinberg: An Analysis of 
Conditions in Partial Restraint of Marriage, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 265, 271 (2009); see also 
HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., BOGERT’S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 211 (2019) (“A 
provision that amounts to a general restraint on marriage is contrary to public policy . . . .”).  
 250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1983).  
 251. Macklin, supra note 249, at 270–71.  
 252. 52 Va. (11 Gratt) 804 (1854).  
 253. Id. at 805.  
 254. See id. 
 255. Id. at 809.  
 256. Id. at 806 (“It will not be questioned that marriages of a suitable and proper character, 
founded on the mutual affection of the parties, and made upon free choice, are of the greatest 
importance to the best interests of society, and should be by all proper means promoted and 
encouraged.”).  
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Consistent with the policy principles above outlined, a 
condition rendering a gift contingent upon not marrying 
anyone is invalid, unless clearly motivated by an intention to 
provide support until the event of marriage. Restraints 
limited as to persons, group, or time are excepted from the 
general condemnation . . . unless the remaining sphere of 
permissible marriages is so small that a permitted marriage 
is not likely to occur.257 
2.  Partial Restraints on Marriage 
By contrast, partial restraints on marriage are limited in time or apply 
to a specific class of persons.258 Generally, partial restraints on marriage 
are “upheld if they do not unreasonably restrict the freedom of the 
beneficiary’s choice” of spouse.259 When evaluating partial restraints on 
marriage, most courts will use a reasonableness test.260 However, some 
courts may not.261 Several cases concerning partial restraints on marriage 
have shed light on how courts balance public policy concerns while still 
honoring broad testamentary freedom. It is also important to note that 
many cases involving partial restraints on marriage are related to the 
testator’s religious beliefs.262  
 
 257. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 6, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 
1983)). The phrase “unless the remaining sphere of permissible marriages is so small that a 
permitted marriage is not likely to occur” could apply to a provision requiring a gay or lesbian 
beneficiary to marry someone of the opposite sex. This application thus supports both the 
argument that such a provision would be a total restraint on marriage, and that such a provision 
would be unreasonable—and thus against public policy. See Emalee G. Popoff, Note, 
Testamentary Conditions in Restraint of the Marriage of Homosexual Donees, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 
163, 170 (2014) (“[U]nreasonable limits on a donee’s opportunity to marry are void as contrary 
to public policy.”). 
 258. Ruth Sarah Lee, Over My Dead Body: A New Approach to Testamentary Restraints on 
Marriage, 14 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 55, 56 (2012).  
 259. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 868 (Or. 1954). See also In re 
Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1956) (“Conditions in partial restraint of 
marriage which merely impose reasonable restrictions upon marriage are not against public 
policy.”); Hanna, supra note 249, at 336–37 (“Testators can only impose reasonable conditions 
and this usually depends on the sphere of eligible partners available for the beneficiary to marry.”).  
 260. See PAGE, supra note 249, § 44.25; Bonfanti, supra note 241, at 361; Hanna, supra note 
249, at 336–37; Macklin, supra note 249, at 272. 
 261. Lee, supra note 258, at 61 (“Not every court applies the Reasonableness Test, but many 
do.”).  
 262. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1983) (“An otherwise effective provision in a donative transfer which is designed to prevent 
the acquisition or retention of property on account of adherence to or rejection of certain religious 
beliefs or practices on the part of the transferee is valid.”).  
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In U.S. National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass,263 the testator’s will 
provided that his daughter would only receive her bequest if she had not 
married a man of the Catholic faith—or become a member of the Catholic 
faith herself—upon the testator’s death and upon her attaining the age of 
thirty-two.264  After the testator’s death, his daughter turned thirty-two, 
but she was already married to a man who was a member of the Catholic 
faith.265 The critical issue regarding the validity of the testamentary 
restraint upon marriage was an issue of first impression for the court.266 
Ultimately, the court adhered to a very broad idea of testamentary 
freedom.267 In doing so, the court relied on two general principles: (1) the 
great freedom the law confers on a testator to dispose of her property as 
she wishes, and (2) the freedom of opinion in religious matters.268 The 
restraint on marriage was seen to be only a partial and temporary restraint 
because after reaching the age of thirty-two, the daughter was able to 
marry a man of the Catholic faith.269 Therefore, the clause was not void 
as against public policy.270  
In Gordon v. Gordon,271 the testator’s will provided, “If any of my 
said children shall marry a person not born in the Hebrew faith then I 
hereby revoke the gift or gifts and the provision or provisions herein made 
to or for such child.”272 One of the testator’s children, Harold, married a 
woman who was not born in the Hebrew faith but undertook religious 
instructions after learning about the provision in the will.273 Relying on 
the Restatement (First) of Property, the court stated, “It is generally held 
in this country that partial restraints on marriage are valid unless 
unreasonable.”274 The court found that the testator’s condition did not 
contravene the Fourteenth Amendment because the condition was not 
based on anyone’s religious belief at the time of marriage, rather it was 
based on religious beliefs at the time of the child’s birth.275 Therefore, the 
provision was upheld and not void as against public policy.276  
 
 263. 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954). 
 264. Id. at 862. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. at 865 (“It was within his power, with or without assigning any reason therefor, 
to have completely disinherited his daughter and left her in a state of impecunious 
circumstances.”).  
 268. Id. at 864.  
 269. Id. at 868.  
 270. Id. at 870. 
 271. 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1995). 
 272. Id. at 230.  
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 234.  
 275. Id. at 235.  
 276. See id. 
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Shapira v. Union National Bank277 is another example where a court 
held that partial restraints on marriage are not against public policy.278 In 
Shapira, the testator’s will provided that his son, Daniel, would only 
receive his share if he was married to a Jewish girl, whose parents were 
both Jewish, upon the testator’s death.279 After the testator’s death, Daniel 
was twenty-one years old, unmarried, and a student at Youngtown State 
University.280 Daniel claimed that the provision was unreasonable, 
unconstitutional, and against public policy.281 The question before the 
court was not whether Daniel’s constitutional right to marry was being 
restricted, but rather whether the testator’s restriction upon his son’s 
inheritance could be enforced.282 The court recognized “[t]he great 
weight of authority in the United States is that gifts conditioned upon the 
beneficiary’s marrying within a particular religious class or faith are 
reasonable.”283  
In Shapira, Daniel tried to rely on the reasonableness test used in 
Maddox, but the court in Shapira distinguished the facts from those in 
Maddox.284 In Shapira, the court focused on the testator’s intent and how 
it was not to punish his son but rather to preserve the Jewish faith.285 
Therefore, it was the duty of the court to honor the testator’s intent so 
long as it did not violate public policy, which the court found that it did 
not.286 
On the other hand, and going against the holdings of Snodgrass, 
Gordon, and Shapira, the Illinois Court of Appeals struck down a 
provision in a will as void against public policy in In re Estate of 
Feinberg.287 In Feinberg, the testator’s trust contained a provision, 
known as the Jewish Clause, which stated: “A descendant of mine other 
than a child of mine who marries outside the Jewish faith (unless the 
spouse of such descendant has converted or converts within one year of 
the marriage to the Jewish faith) and his or her descendants shall be 
deemed to be deceased for all purposes of this instrument as of the date 
 
 277. 315 N.E. 2d 825 (Ct. Cm. Pl. Ohio 1974). 
 278. Id. at 832.  
 279. See id. at 826.  
 280. Id.  
 281. Id. at 826. 
 282. See id. at 828.  
 283. Id. at 829.  
 284. Id. at 831 (“Daniel is not at all confined in his choice to residents of this county, which 
is a very different circumstance in this day of travel by plane and freeway and communication by 
telephone, from the horse and buggy days of the 1854 Maddox v. Maddox decision.”).  
 285. Id. at 832.  
 286. Id.  
 287. See 891 N.E.2d 549, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), rev’d, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009).  
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of such marriage.”288 The testator, Max, died in 1986 and his wife, Erla, 
died in 2003.289 Max and Erla were survived by two children, Michael 
and Leila, and five grandchildren.290 At the time of this lawsuit, the only 
grandchild who was married to a person of the Jewish faith was Jon.291 
The court began its analysis by stating that Illinois courts have 
“reaffirmed the underlying principle that testamentary provisions are 
invalid if they discourage marriage or encourage divorce.”292 Unlike 
Shapira and Gordon, where provisions encouraging a partial restraint on 
marriage were upheld, the court of appeals did not want to depart from 
Illinois law because it found that the Jewish Clauses (Clause) seriously 
limited the beneficiaries’ right to marry.293 In Shapira, the court focused 
on the testator’s intent and how it was to preserve the Jewish faith and 
not to punish his son.294 However, in Feinberg, the court of appeals took 
the opposite view and found that the Clause discouraged marriage and 
therefore violated public policy.295 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the Illinois Court 
of Appeals decision in Feinberg II,296 finding that the Clause did not 
violate public policy.297 The issue before the court was to determine  
whether the holder of a power of appointment over the assets 
of a trust may, without violating the public policy of the state 
of Illinois, direct that the assets be distributed at the time of 
her death to then-living descendants of the settlor, deeming 
deceased any descendant who has married outside the 
settlor’s religious tradition.298  
More specifically, the clause in Feinberg exposed the tension between 
testamentary freedom and “dead hand” control.299 Turning to the 
 
 288. Id. at 550.  
 289. Id. at 549.  
 290. Id. at 549–50.  
 291. Id. at 550.  
 292. Id. (“As early as 1898, our supreme court set forth the general rule that testamentary 
provisions which act as a restraint upon marriage or which encourage divorce are void as against 
public policy.”).  
 293. Id. at 552.  
 294. Id. at 558.  
 295. Id. at 552 (“The provision’s clear intent was to influence the marriage decisions of 
Max’s grandchildren based on a religious criterion and thus to discourage marriage by the 
grandchildren other than to those of the Jewish faith. This provision violated public policy . . . .”).  
 296. 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009). 
 297. Id. at 905–06.  
 298. Id. at 892.  
 299. Id. at 894 (“This tension is clearly demonstrated by the three opinions of the appellate 
court.”).  
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constitution, statutes, and long-standing caselaw of Illinois, the court 
stated, “[T]he public policy of this state values freedom of testation as 
well as freedom of contract . . . .”300 Furthermore, it is evident that Illinois 
favors testamentary freedom.301 The court looked at the testator’s intent, 
stating that the purpose of the clause was to further his commitment to 
Judaism.302 This rationale is also seen in Shapira, where the court looked 
at the testator’s intent, claiming that his intent was to preserve the Jewish 
faith and not to punish his children.303  
To determine if the Clause violated public policy, the court first noted 
that it did not incentivize divorce—rather, it involved the decision to 
marry.304 The court went a step further by stating that Max’s will and trust 
did not create any vested interest in his children or grandchildren and, as 
a result, a complete restraint on marriage would be operative.305 The 
Clause did not operate as a restraint on marriage because it was only 
effective upon Erla’s death.306 Therefore, the provision was not contrary 
to public policy.307 However, the state supreme court focused more on 
Erla’s power of appointment, rather than on the actual validity of the 
clause itself. 
From the cases listed above, it is evident that total restraints on 
marriage are void and against public policy. However, partial restraints 
on marriage are consistently upheld by courts, under a broad view of 
testamentary freedom, if such restraints are deemed to be “reasonable.” 
Courts recognize that there is a public policy promoting the 
encouragement of marriage; however, courts may instead focus on the 
testator’s intent and religious beliefs when evaluating the restraint to 
justify its reasonableness, as seen in Shapira and Feinberg II. If a court 
believes the testator’s intent was to preserve his faith and not to punish 
the beneficiaries, the provisions will most likely be upheld. Only when a 
 
 300. Id. at 895 (“Under the Probate Act, Max and Erla had no obligation to make any 
provision at all for their grandchildren.”).  
 301. See id. at 896 (“As demonstrated by the Probate Act, the Trusts Act, the Statute 
Concerning Perpetuities, and the Rule in Shelley’s Case Abolishment Act, the public policy of 
the state of Illinois protects the ability of an individual to distribute his property, even after his 
death, as he chooses, with minimal restrictions under state law.”).  
 302. Id. 
 303. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.  
 304. Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 899.  
 305. Id. at 903 (“As this court noted in Ransdell, a condition precedent, even if a ‘complete 
restraint’ on marriage, ‘will, if broken, be operative and prevent the devise from taking effect.’ 
However, ‘[w]hen the condition is subsequent and void it is entirely inoperative, and the donee 
retains the property unaffected by its breach.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Ransdell v. Boston, 
50 N.E. 111, 114 (Ill. 1898))).  
 306. Id. (“Michele’s choices regarding when to marry and whom to marry were entirely 
unrestricted, even though, as it turns out, those choices did have consequences for her.”).  
 307. Id.  
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provision completely restricts a beneficiary’s right to marry will a court 
strike the provision, as seen in Maddox. Interestingly, testamentary 
provisions that encourage separation or divorce from a spouse are invalid 
and against public policy.308 However, when the testator’s dominant 
intent is to provide support in the event of divorce or separation, the 
restraint will be valid.309  
Feinberg II and Shapira have their limits, however. In both of those 
cases, the beneficiaries were not homosexual, and in both cases, the 
restraints were only partial. Furthermore, applying comment j of the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts to both cases, the beneficiaries’ remaining 
spheres of permissible marriages were not so small that marriage was not 
likely to occur. Thus, the court weighed the testators’ intent—with regard 
to religious beliefs— against restrictions that arguably did not violate 
public policy. Therefore, the provisions were upheld.310 
B.  Religion 
Another of the most common types of discriminatory bequests is when 
a testator tries to control which religion, if any, a beneficiary will 
practice.311 As seen above, most cases involving religion are entangled 
with partial or total restraints on marriage.312 However, that is not always 
 
 308. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1983) (“An otherwise effective restriction in a donative transfer which is designed to permit the 
acquisition or retention of an interest in property by the transferee only in the event of a separation 
or divorce from the transferee's spouse is invalid, unless the dominant motive of the transferor is 
to provide support in the event of separation or divorce, in which case the restraint is valid.”); see 
also Brizendine v. Am. Trust  & Sav. Bank, 101 So. 618, 622 (Ala. 1924) (striking a provision 
encouraging the testator’s son not to associate with his wife as void against public policy); In re 
Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. 1975) (“In Illinois public policy as revealed by the 
decisions of this court holds that a condition annexed to a devise or bequest, the tendency of which 
is to encourage divorce or bring about a separation of husband and wife is against public policy, 
and the condition is void.”); In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967) (holding that 
a provision in a will was conducive to divorce because it encouraged the beneficiaries to remarry 
Greek men and therefore, violated public policy). 
 309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1983).  
 310. In upholding the provision at issue in its case, the Shapira court focused heavily upon 
the testator’s intent. The court seemed to view the provision’s discriminatory effect as a byproduct 
of the testator expressing his intent. To support this viewpoint, the court pointed out that the will’s 
alternative provision—that the property be given to the State of Israel—demonstrated the 
testator’s deep convictions, not an intent to discriminate against non-Jews. In contrast, the court 
in Feinberg II attached more weight to the free practice of religion. Specifically, the court’s 
discussion of testamentary freedom was couched in the context of “dead hand” religious control. 
So, in Feinberg II, testamentary freedom was less of a driving factor than was the recognition that 
the testator could influence religious and marital choices posthumously.  
 311. Hanna, supra note 249, at 344. 
 312. Id. at 336–37, 344 (noting that one of the most common examples of restraints on 
marriage is when beneficiaries must select a spouse belonging to the testator’s religion).  
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the case. Testators may include provisions that only apply to which 
religion a beneficiary will practice.313 To uphold these types of 
discriminatory bequests, courts tend to rely on the reasonableness test 
applied in cases that involve partial restraints on marriage.314 
For example, in Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice,315 the court 
upheld a will provision directing the beneficiary to live up to and observe 
only the faith of the Roman Catholic Church.316 The plaintiff claimed that 
the clause was an invalid restriction on her rights, but the court 
disagreed.317 In support of the religious provision, the court stated, “Such 
a condition is not contrary to any established policy of the common law, 
or of any law of this State, and is valid and binding . . . .”318 The court 
went further and held that neither the state constitution nor the federal 
Constitution affected its conclusion because “the mere inducement to 
adopt or to adhere to a particular religious belief is not a denial of 
religious freedom.”319 Therefore, the provision was not against public 
policy.320  
When analyzing provisions that control what religion a beneficiary 
will practice, some courts use the reasonableness test used when 
analyzing provisions that create partial restraints on marriage.321 Further, 
when analyzing provisions that require beneficiaries to practice a certain 
religion, courts tend to uphold these provisions in support of testamentary 
and religious freedom. Therefore, simply requiring a beneficiary to 
follow the teachings of a certain religion to receive a bequest is likely not 
against public policy. 
 
 313. See In re Kempf’s Will, 297 N.Y.S. 307, 312 (App. Div. 1937) (holding that a provision 
requiring a beneficiary to adhere to the Roman Catholic Religion was not against public policy 
because it did not deprive the beneficiary of his freedom of religion and reasoning that the testator 
was merely furthering his interests of his chosen religion), aff’d, 16 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 1938).  
 314. Hanna, supra note 249, at 344 (“The courts have traditionally abstained from 
encroaching on the testator’s attitudes [on] this controversial subject and have also hid[den] 
behind the shield of the bequests’ ‘reasonableness.’”); see also Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E. 2d 
228, 234 (Mass. 1955) (stating that a restriction conditioned upon the religious faith of the parents 
of a prospective wife at the time of her birth was not unreasonable because it was not conditioned 
on anyone’s religious belief at the time of marriage).  
 315. 31 A.2d 383 (Del. Ch. 1943), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Crumlish v. Delaware 
Tr. Co., 38 A.2d 463 (Del. 1944). 
 316. Id. at 389.  
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id.  
 320. Id.  
 321. See Hanna, supra note 249, at 336–37; cf. Amin, supra note 156, at 580 (discussing the 
reasonableness standard as it relates to judicial impartiality). 
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In contrast, the court in Drace v. Klinedinst322 struck a will provision 
that required the beneficiaries to remain faithful to a particular religion.323 
The court held, “The right of the citizens of the commonwealth to 
worship God in accordance with the dictates of their own conscience is a 
landmark of the old colony.”324 The provision violated public policy 
because it forced the beneficiaries to adhere to a certain faith, which the 
court viewed to be a punishment.325 However, Drace is an example of the 
minority view and was later distinguished by the same court in In re 
Estate of Laning.326  
In cases involving religious beliefs and marriage, courts have 
continued to uphold restrictive provisions in support of testamentary and 
religious freedom. The Comment to Restatement (Second) of Property 
§ 8.1 states that individuals are free to advocate their theological views 
to others, even when it is in the form of a religious restraint attached to a 
donative transfer.327 In Shapira, the court noted, “The great weight of 
authority in the United States is that gifts conditioned upon the 
beneficiary’s marrying within a particular religious class or faith are 
reasonable.”328 The court recognized that the public policy of Ohio favors 
freedom of religion, but that the facts of the case constituted a partial 
restraint on marriage and not a restraint on freedom of religion.329 These 
cases illustrate how courts may sidestep the issue of religious freedom by 
focusing more on the testator’s intent instead of the restrictive provision’s 
impact on a beneficiary.  
While a provision only discussing marriage might be easier to 
analyze, the issue gets more complex if the condition at issue relates to 
the testator’s religious beliefs. In Feinberg II and Shapira, the courts 
focused on the testator’s intent and honored his religious beliefs despite 
any negative impact on the beneficiary. Such focus harkens back to the 
potential conflict between RFRAs and antidiscrimination statutes, 
 
 322. 118 A. 907 (Pa. 1922). 
 323. Id. at 908. 
 324. Id. at 909. 
 325. Id. 
 326. See 339 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 1975) (“Not only would the condition in Drace have 
required improper inquiries into the content of religious doctrine, but the intrusion into the 
ecclesiastical domain would have been magnified by the need to probe into the beliefs of the 
remaindermen. In contrast, the bequest involved here requires no inquiry into either doctrine or 
belief. All that need be determined is whether the beneficiaries are or are not members of the 
specified church.”).  
 327. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1983).  
 328. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E. 2d 825, 829 (Ct. Comm. Pl. Ohio 1974). 
 329. Id.; see also In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct. 1956) 
(“Conditions in partial restraint of marriage which merely impose reasonable restrictions upon 
marriage are not against public policy.”). 
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wherein some courts appear to allow discrimination—even if it is 
otherwise prohibited by statute—if that discrimination is based on 
religious beliefs.330  
In general, there is a strong public policy that favors religion and 
allows testators to impose their religious beliefs onto beneficiaries. The 
majority of courts have upheld restrictive provisions by focusing more on 
the testator’s intent to preserve the testator’s faith as opposed to how the 
provision will affect the beneficiaries. The minority case of Drace, 
however, illustrated one court’s rare approach, where the court sided with 
the beneficiaries and viewed the provision as punitive. Instead of 
focusing on the testator’s intent, as the court did in Shapira, the court in 
Drace paid attention to the long-lasting effect the provision would have 
on the beneficiaries if they were forced to adhere to a particular religion. 
Nevertheless, most courts favor broad testamentary freedom regardless 
of whether the provision is a partial restraint on marriage or a restraint on 
religion.  
C.  Disruption of Family Relationships 
In addition to total restraints on marriage and limitations imposed on 
one’s religious freedom, provisions in a will or trust that encourage the 
disruption of family ties are generally deemed to violate public policy.331 
The Restatement (Second) of Property states: 
An otherwise effective provision in a donative transfer 
which is designed to permit the acquisition or retention of an 
interest in property only in the event of either the 
continuance of an existing separation or the creation of a 
future separation of a family relationship, other than that of 
husband and wife, is invalid where the dominant motive of 
the transferor was to promote such a separation.332  
On the same note, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts states, “A trust 
or a condition or other provision in the terms of a trust is 
ordinarily . . . invalid if it tends to encourage disruption of a family 
relationship or to discourage formation or resumption of such a 
relationship.”333 More specifically, provisions that negatively impact 
 
 330. See supra notes 138–145 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 242 and accompanying discussion.  
 332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1983).  
 333. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003).  
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children—by, for example, preventing a child from living with a parent 
or from interacting with his or her siblings—violate public policy.334 
The majority of courts have stricken provisions that disrupt family ties 
where those ties involve children. For example, in Estate of Romero,335 
the court struck a will provision directing the testator’s two minor sons to 
live without their mother, finding that the provision violated public policy 
and encouraged the dissolution of family ties.336 Courts may also strike 
provisions that negatively impact adult children. In Zdanowich v. 
Sherwood,337 the testator’s will included a condition such that his wife 
was not allowed to use any of the funds she received from the estate to 
support their adult son.338 The court held that the provision was contrary 
to public policy since parents have an obligation to support their children 
if the children cannot support themselves or are physically or mentally 
handicapped.339 However, courts may uphold a provision if it is viewed 
as only a partial restraint. In Latorraca v. Latorraca,340 for example, the 
testator bequeathed, to his widow, a right to reside in the family home, 
on the condition that she did not live in the home with her mother or any 
other relatives.341 The plaintiff argued that the provision disrupted family 
ties; however, the court disagreed.342 The court held that the provision did 
not disrupt family ties because the plaintiff was not prevented from 
continuing to visit or entertain her other family members.343 Therefore, 
the restriction was not a total restraint.344  
Accordingly, it seems that the majority of courts will strike provisions 
that encourage a disruption of family ties, especially in cases involving 
minor children and custody, as seen in Romero. However, the lines blur 
in cases where a court sees only a partial restraint. In these situations, 
courts may look at the testator’s intent when determining the motive 
behind the provision. For example, in Latorraca, the court considered the 
testator’s intent and stated that the testator may have feared that his own 
children “might come to take second place to his wife’s kindred.”345 
 
 334. See id. (“The policy against undermining family relationships applies as well to trust 
provisions that discourage a person from living with or caring for a parent or child or from social 
interaction with siblings.”). 
 335. 847 P.2d 319 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
 336. See id. at 323.  
 337. 110 A.2d 290 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1954).  
 338. Id. at 291.  
 339. Id. at 293.  
 340. 26 A.2d 522 (N.J. Ch. 1942), aff’d per curiam, 31 A.2d 819 (N.J. 1943). 
 341. Id. at 526.  
 342. Id.  
 343. Id.  
 344. See id.  
 345. Id. 
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Thus, even if a provision clearly causes a disruption of family ties, a court 
may look to the testator’s intent to justify upholding the provision.   
In light of the cases above, the most problematic conditions in wills 
and trusts involve marriage, religion, divorce, and the disruption of 
family ties. Courts recognize that public policies encourage marriage, 
family ties, and religion, but disfavor the promotion of divorce. More 
specifically, when evaluating conditions on marriage and religion, the 
most important distinction is whether the condition is seen to be a partial 
or total restraint. If the condition is a total restraint on marriage, courts 
will strike it. If the condition is only a partial restraint on marriage, courts 
will most likely uphold it in favor of testamentary freedom, but only if it 
is reasonable. The entanglement of religion and divorce raises more 
complex issues. Given the strong public policy in favor of religion, courts 
generally honor a testator’s religious beliefs, even if doing so restricts a 
beneficiary’s beliefs. This is most notably seen in cases involving partial 
restraints on marriage that require the beneficiary to marry a person of a 
certain faith—in which the majority of the provisions are upheld and not 
void as against public policy.  
V.  EXPLORING DIFFERENT OUTCOMES IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN RED 
AND BLUE STATES 
Building upon the prior discussions of interpretation and construction 
doctrines; public policy regarding testamentary provisions that partially 
or totally restrict marriage, divorce, family ties, and religion; and how 
these doctrines and policies can be distorted depending on political 
alignment, this Article introduces a normative analysis of the application 
of these doctrines and policies to pertinent hypotheticals derived from 
real cases.    
A.  Hypothetical One: Same-Sex Marriage 
Picture a trust agreement that creates a trust for the settlor’s son, Kelly. 
The agreement provides that all income is to be distributed to the settlor’s 
son during his life, so long as the son marries a Catholic woman and 
otherwise lives up to, observes, and follows the teachings and faith of the 
Roman Catholic Church. Failure to live up to, observe, and follow the 
teachings and faith of the Roman Catholic Church results in the income 
being donated to Catholic Charities USA. Kelly is married to another man 
at the time of the settlor’s death. Will the provision be upheld? Will Kelly 
take under the trust agreement?346 
 
 346. This hypothetical reveals one of the unanswered questions post-Obergefell: Can a 
testator effectively undermine Obergefell, at least for his would-be beneficiaries, by placing a 
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Where courts will draw the line is a critical issue, especially in cases 
involving homosexual beneficiaries, and such cases have yet to be 
analyzed.347 Several issues present themselves. For example, if a testator 
includes a provision in his will stating, “to my son only if he marries a 
woman,” and his son is gay, will courts view that provision as a total or 
partial restraint on marriage? Does it encourage divorce? Does it 
encourage entering a “sham” marriage to a woman? In challenging this 
condition, will the beneficiary be able to introduce extrinsic evidence? 
Did this testator know that his son was gay? Courts may take a few 
different approaches in answering these questions. Ultimately, these very 
important determinations could depend on which state is reviewing the 
provision. 
1.  In a Red State 
A red-state judge would likely uphold the provision as it applies to 
Kelly. In doing so, a red-state judge would review the provision with a 
focus on the testator’s intent, testamentary freedom, and religious 
freedom. By focusing on the testator’s intent to preserve his faith instead 
of the perceived punishment the provision creates for the beneficiary, the 
red-state judge can avoid the restraint on marriage issue.  
Generally, there is a strong public policy in the United States that 
favors religion and allows testators to preserve their faith.348 This public 
policy, along with opposition to same-sex marriage, is stronger in red 
states than in blue states. Red states tend to have citizens with strong 
Christian beliefs, which results in opposition to same-sex marriage. A 
judge in a red state knows the policies of his state. He knows that the last 
states to legalize same-sex marriage were red states, and he knows that 
most red states only legalized same-sex marriage because the U.S. 
 
potentially total restraint on same-sex marriage that would not be upheld if it applied to a 
traditional marriage? 
 347. Popoff, supra note 257, at 167 (“[N]o court has explicitly accounted for the sexual 
orientation of a donee in determining whether a condition in restraint of the donee’s marriage is 
an unenforceable violation of public policy.”). Close to accounting for the sexual orientation of a 
donee is a case where a settlor’s grandson could not take unless the grandson’s father—the 
settlor’s son—married the grandson’s mother. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Gay Judge Contends 
His Dad’s Marriage Mandate in Will Violates Public Policy, ABA J. (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/gay_judge_contends_his_dads_marriage_mandate_in_
will_violates_public_policy [https://perma.cc/2C3F-CVV4]. The settlor’s son, a New York judge, 
was gay and had married his partner. Id. The judge in that case ultimately determined that the 
marriage mandate would probably stand. See Roger Friedman, Alec Baldwin Irony: Judge Who 
Ruled for Him in Stalker Case Is Gay, SHOWBIZ 411 (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:37 AM), 
https://www.showbiz411.com/2013/11/18/alec-baldwin-irony-judge-who-ruled-for-him-in-
stalker-case-is-gay [https://perma.cc/L85K-WJPW]. 
 348. See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ct. Comm. Pl. Ohio 1974). 
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Supreme Court required them to do so after Obergefell.349 The red-state 
judge also knows that many red states are creating roadblocks for same-
sex couples who want to adopt children. These red states have passed 
laws that allow an adoption agency to deny same-sex couples the 
opportunity to adopt based on the adoption agency’s religious beliefs.350 
The red-state judge certainly knows that many of these states, along with 
additional red states, have also passed RFRAs.351 He knows that these 
laws evidence red states’ policies on same-sex marriage and religious 
freedom, clearly showing that red states have a strong policy in favor of 
religious freedom and against same-sex marriage. He knows that his red 
state has these policies, and he knows he must please his voters. Put 
another way, to remain a judge, the red-state judge will decide the case 
in a way that his voters would decide it: he will rule red.  
To find that the provision does not violate public policy, a red-state 
judge would focus on the testator’s intent, testamentary freedom, and 
religious freedom. He would rely on the reasoning in Fitzmaurice and 
conclude that this provision is simply an inducement to adopt a religion, 
which is not against public policy.352 Further, a red-state judge would find 
that the testator’s intent was to preserve the Roman Catholic Faith, not to 
punish his son—and the court must honor the testator’s intent as long as 
it does not violate public policy.353 Although the provision potentially 
violates public policy because of the restraint on marriage, the red-state 
judge would sidestep this issue by finding only a partial restraint on 
marriage. He would follow the reasoning in Shapira and find that the 
testator’s intent was to preserve the Catholic faith, and further, find that 
the provision does not restrict the marriage because Kelly can marry any 
woman in the world, he just cannot marry a man. By analyzing the 
 
 349. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 350. States with these laws include Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. See Julie Moreau, Religious 
Exemption Laws Exacerbating Foster and Adoption ‘Crisis,’ Report Finds, NBC NEWS (Nov. 
22, 2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/religious-exemption-laws-
exacerbating-foster-adoption-crisis-report-finds-n939326 [https://perma.cc/T24U-76JQ]. Georgia 
also has sought to enact such a law. See, e.g., S.B. 368, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2020); S.B. 375, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018).   
 351. Alabama, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia have all 
passed laws that allow adoption agencies to deny same-sex couples adoption and RFRAs. See 
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/PSA2-ALLQ]. 
 352. Del. Tr. Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383, 389 (Del. Ch. 1943) (“[T]he mere inducement 
to adopt or to adhere to a particular religious belief is not a denial of religious freedom.”). This is 
the majority view followed by most states. 
 353. See Levinson et al., supra note 160, at 107; Religious Composition in the Midwest, 
supra note 128. 
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provision this way, the red-state judge could uphold the provision and 
please the citizens of his state.  
However, this leads to obvious questions: Should this be allowed? Is 
this not a total restraint on marriage hidden behind a guise of strong 
religious values? Did the testator know that Kelly was homosexual? If he 
did, it seems more like a total restraint on marriage or a punishment, in 
which case it should be void. What if Kelly was already married? Now 
that the provision is promoting divorce, which is against public policy, 
would a red-state judge be able to work around this? Does it make a 
difference if it is a will or a trust? Beyond the religious freedom that red-
state judges are likely to recognize, a court in Kelly’s hypothetical could 
say that a condition requiring him to marry a woman is only a partial 
restraint on marriage. Although Kelly is gay, a court could technically 
find that he is still free to marry, he is simply not free to marry a man. 
That approach would be loosely related to the rationale used in Shapira. 
In that case, the court found that the relevant restraint was partial (it did 
not totally restrict marriage) and reasonable because based on the number 
of potential spouses in a reasonable geographical area, a marriage 
permitted by the restraint was not prohibitively unlikely. Thus, the 
Shapira court found that the relevant restraint did not violate public 
policy. Following that reasoning, a court could also find this partial 
restraint reasonable based on the number of potential spouses (women) 
in a given area.  
2.  In a Blue State 
As opposed to his red counterpart, a blue-state judge would likely see 
this provision as void against public policy. Blue-state citizens generally 
believe that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.354 In that vein, 
blue-state judges are more likely to reason that if a beneficiary is 
homosexual, a provision requiring him to marry someone of the opposite 
sex is a total restraint on marriage.355  
Additionally, blue states do not have the same strong public policy in 
favor of freedom of religion that red states have,356 and blue states tend 
to have lower rates of Christianity.357 This combination—of individuals 
who generally believe that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry 
 
 354. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 355. Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (concluding that, in regard to 
marriage, homosexuals’ “immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path 
to this profound commitment”). 
 356. See discussion supra Section II.A.3; see also David Johnson & Katy Steinmetz, This 
Map Shows Every State with Religious-Freedom Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2015), https://time.com/ 
3766173/religious-freedom-laws-map-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/SHD6-ZRRJ]. 
 357. However, blue states are correlated with a higher rate of Catholicism, which could play 
an important factor in this particular scenario. See supra Section II.A.3. 
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and a general lack of strong religious opposition to same-sex marriage—
would result in a court focusing less on the testator’s intent (of promoting 
his religious beliefs) and more on the effect the provision has on the 
beneficiary.  
Before reaching the marriage issue, however, the blue-state judge 
might first analyze the religious implications behind the provision. By its 
express terms, the provision requires Kelly to follow “the teachings and 
faith of the Roman Catholic Church.” Thus, Kelly must be a Roman 
Catholic. From that, a blue-state court—already unexcited to incorporate 
religion into its laws of succession—might be hesitant to require Kelly to 
practice Catholicism to receive his bequest. Notwithstanding this 
hesitancy, however, under Shapira and Feinberg II, the blue-state court 
might have its hands tied and be forced to uphold the provision’s religious 
inducement. 
That said, the provision is not just an inducement to practice a certain 
religion. The provision also creates a marital restriction. The Catholic 
Church believes that marriage is a sacred bond between a man and a 
woman.358 By requiring Kelly to follow the teachings of the Roman 
Catholic Church, the testator is placing restrictions on Kelly’s personal 
life choices because Kelly cannot marry a man if he wishes to receive 
from the trust. If Kelly is engaged to a man, obviously Kelly has failed to 
follow the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and therefore would 
not take under the agreement. 
Accordingly, a blue-state judge would likely find that the provision is 
a total restraint on marriage because blue states support same-sex 
marriage. Thus, although Kelly could marry any woman he pleases, a 
blue-state judge would find that the provision creates a total restraint 
since Kelly is not allowed to marry another man if he wants to receive 
under the trust. Finding that the provision creates a total restraint on 
marriage, the blue-state judge would declare the provision void as against 
public policy. 
An elected blue-state judge would likely reach this result because, as 
previously discussed, he would be influenced by public opinion. Pleasing 
the blue voters allows the judge to keep his position; elected judges are 
swayed by their constituents’ opinions, especially opinions on important 
social issues like same-sex marriage. Knowing that the blue citizens are 
proponents of same-sex marriage, the judge would focus on the total 




 358. Why is Marriage Important to the Catholic Church?, DIOCESE PHX. (Mar. 1, 2006), 
https://dphx.org/why-is-marriage-important-to-the-catholic-church/ [https://perma.cc/8TSA-FTAM]. 
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3.  Expanding on the Hypothetical Answers: Considering 
Future Questions 
Alternatively, what if the testator did not consider same-sex marriage 
in his provision but instead just wanted Kelly to be Catholic? Would this 
change a blue-state judge’s analysis? Presumably, it would not change a 
red-state judge’s analysis because those judges would respect the 
testator’s religious freedom with or without the provision regarding 
marriage. A blue-state judge, on the other hand, might have his hands tied 
because now—without the same-sex marriage provision explicitly 
included—maybe there is no longer a perceived “total restraint” on 
marriage.359 Admittedly, a blue-state judge would not be far out of line to 
say that whether or not the marriage provision appeared explicitly, a 
requirement to live up to the Catholic faith is effectively a total restraint 
on marriage since Catholics disallow gay marriage. 
Relatedly, what if there was no residual clause providing for the gift 
to go to the Catholic Charities USA? Would this allow a blue-state judge 
to sufficiently distinguish Kelly’s case from Shapira, where the court 
enforced a provision that forced the beneficiary to practice a particular 
religion? Would the blue-state judge be inclined to so distinguish 
Shapira?  
Another consideration is the fact that blue states tend to have higher 
rates of Catholicism than red states do. So, while traditional Catholics 
would disavow homosexuality, blue states are more progressive as a 
whole. Concomitantly, Catholics are more likely to be progressive than 
are, for example, evangelical Protestants. Perhaps, at least in a blue state, 
judges would recognize a more progressive viewpoint, allowing Kelly’s 
same-sex marriage to stand while otherwise enforcing strict Catholicism. 
 
359. See, e.g., Barnum v. Mayor of Baltimore, 62 Md. 275, 291 (1884) (recognizing the 
testator’s right to make the enjoyment of his bounty dependent upon the condition that the 
beneficiary withdraw from the priesthood and cut ties with the Catholic Church); Gordon v. 
Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Mass. 1955) (“The basis of the majority rule seems to be that an 
inducement by way of gift to adopt or to adhere to a particular religious belief is not a denial of 
religious freedom. The beneficiary can reject the gift.”); Magee v. O’Neill, 19 S.C. 170, 185, 190 
(1883) (“As to that public policy which is within the cognizance of courts, we cannot conceive of 
a better definition than that given by a distinguished English judge, viz.: ‘It cannot be the mere 
opinion of the judge upon any general question of public policy, or, in other words, whether the 
judges think that the interests of the public would be better advanced by tolerating or refusing to 
tolerate such provisos, but whether they are in contravention of any established law, or in 
contravention of the spirit, though not against the letter of the law.’”) (“We can not say that the 
terms of this will so far exceed the license which is allowed the citizen in the disposition of his 
own property, as to render it void as against public policy.”); In re James’ Estate, 76 N.W.2d 553, 
556 (Wis. 1956) (holding that a condition requiring a beneficiary to raise his children is not 
contrary to public policy). Notably, North and South Dakota have specific statutory restrictions 
against conditions that restrain marriage. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-25; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 43-3-4; see also Johnson & Steinmetz, supra note 356 (showing a timeline of when states passed 
legislation as of April 2015). 
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Would a red-state judge, heavily influenced by Protestant values, allow 
those values to seep into his interpretation of what Catholicism would 
require of Kelly? 
B.  Hypothetical Two: Adoption of Child Born by ART 
Obergefell established a positive right for same-sex couples to 
marry.360 In declaring state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, 
the Court evidenced a shift toward a more gender-neutral rule of law. In 
other words, “husband” and “wife” were more appropriately replaced 
with “spouse.” While the Obergefell decision has had wide impact on 
areas of law like marriage, employment, and social benefits, its effect on 
the laws of succession remains unclear.361 Accordingly, this Part 
addresses one of the many issues implicated by modern concepts of 
family: same-sex couples and ART. 
Imagine a couple: Emily and Brooke. Emily and Brooke got married 
in 2018, after the Obergefell decision allowed for the two women to wed. 
Brooke’s parents are very wealthy. Brooke also has numerous siblings, 
all of whom have children. None of Brooke’s siblings used ART to have 
their children, and all of her siblings are in opposite-sex marriages with 
their children’s other genetic parent.  
After being married for several years, Brooke and Emily decide they 
want to have a child of their own. Following some discussion, Brooke 
and Emily decide that Emily will artificially inseminate herself. The 
procedure works, and Emily becomes pregnant, giving birth to a baby 
boy, Jim. Brooke and Emily begin raising the child and, although never 
formally adopting him, Brooke views Jim as her own son.  
Fast forward eighteen years. Brooke’s father has already died, leaving 
all his property to his wife, Brooke’s mother. Brooke’s mother settles an 
irrevocable trust “for my benefit until I die, then for the benefit of my 
grandchildren.” Brooke’s mother puts all of her property into the trust. 
Shortly after creating the trust—but before any distribution is due—
Brooke’s mother dies unexpectedly. The trustee makes the first 
distribution in accordance with the trust agreement, but he refuses to 
distribute to Brooke and Emily’s son, claiming Jim is not within the class 
of beneficiaries. Jim files litigation to compel the trustee to distribute to 
Jim an equal share. 
 
 360. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.  2584, 2607 (2015) (“The Constitution, however, does 
not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to 
couples of the opposite sex.”). 
 361. In other words, because the Obergefell decision is so recent, few donative instruments 
have utilized Obergefell’s decision. Thus, not many donative-law concepts have been implicated 
in the context of same-sex couples. 
900 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
1.  In a Red State 
Preliminarily, the key issue within Jim’s litigation is whether 
Brooke’s mother intended to include Jim in the class of “grandchildren” 
beneficiaries despite Jim having no genetic or legal relationship to 
Brooke’s mother. Under the current position of applicable law in red 
states, it is unlikely that Jim would be included in the class of 
beneficiaries for Brooke’s mother’s trust. First, the most important reality 
to recognize is the public policy that drives red states’ approach to ART: 
a hesitancy to recognize same-sex couples using ART. This hesitancy is 
demonstrated by red states lagging in improving same-sex couples’ 
access to ART.362 With that public policy surrounding a red state’s court, 
Jim may struggle to find equal treatment as his cousins—children of 
different-sex, non-ART-using parents. 
Second, beyond their public policy, red states are less likely to expand 
the marital presumption beyond its traditional form of presuming the 
“husband” of the birth mother was the father.363 Thus, because Brooke is 
not Emily’s husband, a red-state court may decline to expand the 
presumption beyond its traditional recognition of paternity rather than 
parentage. Further, if the red-state judge strictly adhered to statutory text, 
the pertinent state law may be drafted in such a way that requires the 
presumption only be applied to heterosexual couples. 
Lastly, second-parent adoption seems unlikely to save Jim in a red 
state. Red states evidence general favor toward a two-parent home where 
one parent is male and the other is female.364 Hence, few red states have 
adopted second-parent adoption statutes. The effect of no second-parent 
adoption prevents Brooke from adopting Jim unless Emily relinquishes 
parental rights. In other words, Jim can either be Brooke’s legal child or 
Emily’s, but not both. Emily—as birth mother—is unlikely to relinquish 
those rights, so Brooke will never have adopted Jim. Therefore, Jim 
would not be within the class of “grandchildren” beneficiaries. 
2.  In a Blue State 
Under the current position of applicable law in blue states, Jim is much 
more likely to succeed in his desire to be classified as a “grandchild.” 
Blue states have begun to adopt a policy of favoring equal access to ART 
for same-sex couples. With that equal access, equal treatment of children 
who result from same-sex couples using ART is likely to follow. 
 
 362. See supra Section II.A.2. 
 363. See supra Section II.A.1.ii. 
 364. See W. Bradford Wilcox, Red State Families: Better Than We Knew, INST. FOR 
FAM. STUD. (June 11, 2015), https://ifstudies.org/blog/red-state-families-better-than-we-knew/ 
[https://perma.cc/5CXB-PQ5T]; supra Section II.A.1. 
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Accordingly, blue-state courts will couch their analyses of the litigation 
in favor of individuals like Jim. 
Driven by such a policy, a blue-state court is likely to apply the marital 
presumption to Jim’s situation. After all, a trend has begun emerging— 
blue states are making their marital presumption statutes gender-neutral. 
Thus, instead of being the “husband” of Emily, Brooke only need be 
Emily’s spouse to take advantage of the marital presumption. And 
because Obergefell mandates recognition of Brooke as Emily’s spouse, a 
court with a gender-neutral marital presumption statute would easily find 
Jim to be Brooke’s child and thus within the class of “grandchildren.” In 
the same vein, even without a gender-neutral statute, 100% of blue states 
have allowed the marital presumption to apply to same-sex couples 
absent an involved third party. Thus, either way, a blue-state court would 
likely rule Jim a “grandchild.” 
In addition to the marital presumption, in a blue state, Brooke would 
likely have been able to adopt Jim without Emily relinquishing parental 
rights because blue states are more likely to permit second-parent 
adoption. Consequently, Brooke could have adopted Jim, and he would 
legally be considered Brooke’s mother’s grandchild. If the blue state did 
not allow second-parent adoption—as not all blue states have—Jim 
would struggle absent some persuasive argument of equitable 
adoption.365 Nonetheless, Jim would likely be covered under the marital 
presumption and, accordingly, be a trust beneficiary.  
3.  Expanding on the Hypothetical Answers: Considering 
Future Questions 
Emily and Brooke’s situation is not the only example of uncertainty 
in the laws of succession when it comes to the evolving outlook of 
marriage and family. For example, what if Emily and Brooke were two 
males married as a gay couple? In that case, the marital presumption 
might less credibly apply. In Emily and Brooke’s hypothetical, Jim is 
most certainly Emily’s son—she birthed him, which is all the marital 
presumption requires of the biological mother. As to Brooke, a strong 
argument could be made that the marital presumption applies to any 
spouse of the birth mother. Thus, Brooke, as the birth mother’s spouse, 
could take advantage of the marital presumption. 
 
 365. For a concise description of equitable adoption and its differing theories of justification, 
see Tritt, Sperms and Estates, supra note 97, at 383–86. In essence, whether under the contract 
theory or estoppel theory of equitable adoption, courts have difficulty finding all the required 
elements for formally proving equitable adoption. Id. at 384–85. Thus, “both of the purported 
theoretical bases for equitable adoption are very limited in application and may produce 
inconsistent and inequitable results.” Id. at 385–86. Accordingly, Jim’s success under an equitable 
adoption theory of recovery is far from guaranteed. 
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However, the same cannot be as easily said for a gay couple. With two 
married males, neither is the biological mother. Thus, even if a state were 
to gender-neutralize its marital presumption statute, neither individual in 
a gay couple could claim to be the spouse of the birth mother. What 
happens then? Does the policy of equality and familial harmony prevail? 
Or would a strict adherence to the text of a marital presumption statute—
even a gender-neutral one—prevent the presumption from applying to a 
gay couple who has taken advantage of ART?366 
Take another complication: What if Emily removed an egg, had that 
egg inseminated in a petri dish, then placed the fertilized egg in Brooke’s 
womb? Would then every state have to apply the marital presumption on 
the notion that—because both Brooke and Emily are “birth mothers”—
both women are equally the spouse of the birth mother and the birth 
mother themselves? Would either Brooke or Emily even need to adopt 
Jim if both play a role in his conception and carriage? How would a red 
state’s public policy regarding same-sex ART create a result different 
from that of a blue state? 
From a different perspective, how does the fact that Brooke’s mother 
settled an irrevocable trust affect the analysis? Does it matter that the trust 
was settled after Emily and Brooke had Jim? What if the trust had been 
revocable or had been written into a will such that it could be altered any 
time before Brooke’s mother’s death? Would that change in facts 
evidence the mother’s acceptance of Jim as one of her “grandchildren” 
because she did not change the terms to specifically exclude Jim? Does it 
matter whether the mother subscribed to a more conservative or liberal 
point of view and how that viewpoint affected her understanding of the 
term “grandchildren”? Would a court even consider such outside 
evidence in determining the meaning of the trust’s terms? 
Or, what if instead of a trust for grandchildren, the hypothetical 
concerned Brooke’s mother’s will? Assume Brooke predeceases her 
mother; does Jim stand in place of Brooke to take her share of the 
mother’s bequest to Brooke? If second-parent adoption is allowed and 
Brooke adopted Jim before dying, it seems like the answer is yes because 
 
 366. An argument could be made that a total gender-neutralized marital presumption statute 
would also remove the term “mother,” thus reading the “spouse of the birth parent.” Through this 
approach, perhaps a gay couple could take advantage of the marital presumption, assuming one 
of the men had used his own sperm to conceive the child. However, a problem arises in this 
approach. The marital presumption’s initial policy was one of efficiency: It focused on paternity 
because maternity was easily established. In short, the traditional marital presumption allowed a 
potential legal fiction to apply to one parent (the father) in favor of familial harmony. With a gay 
couple, on the other hand, the legal fiction would have to apply to both parents because neither 
parent can point to birth as conclusive evidence of paternity. Some may argue—and some states 
may be inclined to accept such argument—that this would be an inappropriate extension of the 
marital presumption. 
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of the abandonment of the stranger-to-adoption doctrine.367 However, 
what result if second-parent adoption is not allowed or Brooke did not 
otherwise adopt Jim? Would a court recognize different rules for taking 
by representation versus being in a class of beneficiaries? 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the Court’s holding in Obergefell, any attempt to 
answer a specific question in the context of ongoing social and legal 
evolution is destined to implicate further questions. Where red and blue 
states evolve in different directions—both socially and legally—
questions that have already been asked, as well as those that remain as 
yet unarticulated, stand to be answered differently from state to state. 
Indeed, all the hypotheticals offered in this Article ask more questions 
than they answer. That result is unavoidable; after all, differences 
between red and blue states are the natural outcome of a federalist system 
of government.368 Federalism’s natural differences are not problematic, 
however. Rather, as this Article illustrates, Obergefell’s effect on the 
future of American succession law can be well-predicted with a proper 
understanding of will construction, the different approaches to applying 
relevant rules and policies, and the influence of public opinion on judges. 
Although a clear picture of future succession law is not yet possible—
indeed, one cannot even tell what color the picture would be—will 
construction suggests that it is possible to sketch versions of the picture 
rather than simply wait for the actual picture to appear. In fact, the first 
step to understanding the future may be understanding different potential 
versions thereof, and the best way to begin that process may be by finding 
questions rather than answers. In the spirit of that solution, this Article 
concludes where it began: with more questions that have yet to be 
answered. 
1. A trust provides that adopted children will not be 
recognized as descendants. Alice, a trust beneficiary, freezes 
her eggs prior to undergoing chemotherapy. She later uses 
those eggs to bear a child using a gestational carrier but must 
legally adopt the child since she is not the “birth mother.” 
Will the child be treated as a descendant under the trust since 
child is genetically related but had to be adopted by genetic 
parent? 
2. A trust is held for the benefit of “descendants.” 
Henry, a trust beneficiary, has his sperm preserved prior to 
undergoing chemotherapy. He dies as a result of his cancer, 
 
 367. For a discussion of the development and eventual abandonment of the stranger-to-the-
adoption rule, see Tritt, supra note 186, at 383–90. 
 368. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 290 (2008) (“[N]onuniformity is a necessary 
consequence of a federalist system of government.”). 
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but eighteen months after his death, his wife gives birth to a 
child conceived with the wife’s egg and Henry’s sperm. Will 
the resulting child be recognized as a “descendant”? 
